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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, 
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND INFLATION 
 
Küsmen, Gamze 
Master of Economics  
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı  
 
February, 2008 
 
Central bank independence (CBI) and inflation relation has long been a 
debate and is established in many studies, such as Bade and Parkin (1982), Alesina 
(1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), and Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyaptı (1992). Although these studies address the negative relation between CBI 
and inflation, they do not consider the effect of the development level of financial 
markets on this relation. Posen (1995) considers the effect of financial market 
development by using effective financial opposition to inflation formed by the 
inflation-averse groups. He tests the effect of this variable on CBI and inflation 
simultaneously. He claims that the variable, which decreases inflation is effective 
financial opposition to inflation (when used with CBI) rather than CBI. Thus, he 
states that rather than analyzing the direct relation between inflation and CBI, the 
effect of effective financial opposition to inflation on CBI and inflation should be 
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investigated. Based on this study, this thesis looks at the effect of financial market 
development (FMD) both on CBI and on the relation between CBI and inflation by 
using alternative indicators for FMD. We find that there is a significant and positive 
relation between CBI and FMD for non-transition countries. Moreover, although 
Posen (1995) states that CBI does not have a significant effect on inflation when 
EFOI is included as an additional explanatory variable, we find evidence that both 
FMD and CBI have a significant effect on inflation. However, the results of the 
estimations are not robust to changes in samples. 
 
Keywords: Central Bank Independence, Financial Market Development, Inflation 
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ÖZET 
MERKEZ BANKASI BAĞIMSIZLIĞI,  
MALİ PİYASALARIN GELİŞMESİ VE ENFLASYON 
 
Küsmen, Gamze 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı  
 
Şubat 2008 
 
Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve enflasyon arasındaki ilişki Bade ve Parkin 
(1982), Alesina (1988,1989), Grilli, Masciandaro ve Tabellini (1991), ve Cukierman, 
Webb ve Neyaptı (1992) başta olmak üzere bugüne kadar birçok çalışmada 
incelenmiştir. Bu araştırmalar merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve enflasyon arasındaki 
negatif ilişkiyi işaret etse de, mali piyasaların gelişmişliğini göz önüne almamaktadır. 
Mali piyasaların gelişmişlik düzeyinin merkez bankası ve enflasyon arasındaki 
ilişkiye etkisini inceleyen ilk araştırma Posen (1995) olmuştur. Posen bu etkiyi 
incelerken enflasyon karşıtı gruplar tarafından oluşturulan “enflasyona karşı etkili 
mali direnişi” kullanmıştır. Kullandığı bu değişkenin merkez bankası bağımsızlığına 
ve enflasyona etkisini ayrı ayrı test etmiştir. Posen bu araştırmasında, merkez bankası 
bağımsızlığının enflasyona karşı oluşan mali direniş sonucu ortaya çıktığını ve 
enflasyonu düşüren değişkenin birçok araştırmada bahsedildiği gibi merkez bankası 
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bağımsızlığı değil, aksine merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ile beraber kullanıldığında 
enflasyona karşı oluşan bu mali direniş olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu yüzden de 
enflasyon ve merkez bankası bağımsızlığı arasındaki ilişkinin değil, bu mali direnişin 
merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve enflasyon üzerindeki etkisinin ayrı ayrı incelenmesi 
gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu tezde Posen’ın bulguları ışığında, mali piyasaların 
gelişmişliğinin merkez bankası ve merkez bankası-enflasyon ilişkisi üzerindeki etkisi 
mali piyasaların gelişmişlik düzeyi için alternatif göstergeler kullanılarak 
incelenmektedir. Sonuç olarak, geçiş ülkesi dışındaki ülkeler için mali piyasaların 
gelişmişliğinin merkez bankası bağımsızlığına etkisinin anlamlı ve posizitif olduğu 
bulunmuştur. Bunun yanısıra, enflasyona karşı olan mali direniş ile birlikte 
kullanıldığında merkez bankası bağımsızlığının enflasyona etkisinin olmadığını ve 
merkez bankası bağımsızlığının etkisinin ancak bu mali direniş yoluyla olabileceğini 
savunan Posen’ın aksine, mali piyasaların gelişmişliğinin yanısıra merkez bankası 
bağımsızlığının da enflasyona etkisi olduğu bulunmuştur.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı, Mali Piyasaların Gelişmişliği, 
Enflasyon. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Central bank independence (CBI) and inflation relation has been studied 
widely, among them being Bade and Parkin (1982), Alesina (1988, 1989), and Grilli, 
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992)1. 
Although these studies address the negative relation between CBI and inflation, they 
do not consider the effect of the development level of financial markets on this 
relation. Posen (1995) considers the effect of financial market development (FMD) 
by using effective financial opposition to inflation (EFOI)2 formed by inflation-
averse groups. He tests the effect of EFOI on CBI and inflation simultaneously. He 
claims that the variable, which decreases inflation is EFOI (when used with CBI) 
rather than CBI. Thus, he states that rather than analyzing the relation between 
inflation and CBI, the effect of EFOI on CBI and inflation should be investigated.  
 
This thesis tests the effect of FMD both on CBI and on the relation between 
CBI and inflation by using alternative indicators for FMD. We find that there is a 
significant and positive relation between CBI and FMD for non-transition countries. 
                                               
1
 Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992) will be abbreviated as CWN (1992) after herein. 
2
 This variable is explained in chapter 3 in detail.  
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Moreover, although Posen (1995) states that CBI does not have a significant effect 
on inflation when EFOI is included as an additional explanatory variable, we find 
evidence that both FMD and CBI have a significant effect on inflation. However, the 
results of the estimations are not robust to changes in samples. 
 
The relationship between CBI and inflation was primarily addressed by Barro 
and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and Prescott (1977), who argue that independent 
central banks provide more credible monetary policies and thus price stability. 
However, CBI and the motivation for the full commitment of central bank to 
monetary policies require support from financial markets. Therefore, interest groups 
such as financial markets are important factors in determining the relationship 
between CBI and inflation. Posen (1995) argues that developed financial markets are 
averse to higher inflation and thus constitute the most important interest group that 
has an effect on the monetary policies of central banks. First of all, CBI is considered 
as one of the tools of a government for selecting “the strength of its commitment to 
price stability” (Cukierman 1992a, chapter 23; Lohmann [1992]). Second, price 
stability, an objective of central bank, is the one thing this group aims at. Therefore, 
Posen (1995) argues that this group’s aversion to inflation, namely EFOI directly 
affects the expectations about inflation and CBI level. Furthermore, as also Neyaptı 
(2003) notes, developed financial markets reduce pressures for expansionary 
monetary policy. Therefore, FMD has a positive effect on price stability and creates a 
supporting environment for CBI. Hence, development level of financial markets is 
important for the CBI and inflation. Depending on this, Posen (1995) claims that 
rather than looking at the relation between CBI and inflation, the effect of EFOI on 
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CBI and inflation should be investigated. Hence, development level of financial 
markets, for which Posen (1995) uses EFOI, is a factor that affects inflation and CBI 
simultaneously. Based on these ideas, we search for the effect of FMD on CBI and, 
by going one step further; we jointly investigate the effect of CBI and FMD on 
inflation. 
 
Instead of EFOI used by Posen (1995), we use alternative measures of FMD 
that are commonly used in the literature, such as the ratio of banking sector total 
credit to GDP, the ratio of credit provided to private sector to GDP, the ratio of credit 
given to private sector to banking sector total credit, and M2 to GDP. Neyaptı (2001) 
uses the ratio of credit provided to private sector to GDP and M2 to GDP, namely 
financial deepening, as FMD indicators and test the effect of CBI and FMD on 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, deficit and real growth in transition 
countries. We choose these variables as alternative indicators of FMD since they are 
directly available and quantitative measures for FMD. 
 
Our hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between CBI and FMD, 
whereas there is a negative relation between CBI and inflation since CBI is directly 
affected by developed financial markets. In order to test our hypotheses, we use these 
FMD indicators and CBI indicators (defined as equal-weighted index of Legal 
Independence, LVAU and unequal-weighted index of Legal Independence, LVAW 
in CWN [1992]) as well as EFOI from Posen (1995). As another point of 
modification to the Posen study, this thesis uses a larger data set that consists of 
samples of transition and non-transition countries. 
  4 
 
 
 
 
We perform Hausman (1978) test in order to choose whether random or fixed 
effect model should be used in the estimations concerning CBI-FMD relation. As the 
result of the Wald and Hausman tests, we perform Fixed Effect technique to estimate 
the relation between CBI and FMD with the annual data of transition countries. We 
use OLS method with period average data of transition countries and non-transition 
countries. Moreover, to test the effect of CBI and FMD on inflation, we use OLS 
method with CBI, FMD and their interactive variables as explanatory variables. 
 
From our estimations, we find that FMD, measured by the ratio of private 
credit to banking sector total credit and the ratio of M2 to GDP, as well as EFOI has 
significant and positive effect on CBI level in non-transition countries. This finding 
is consistent with Posen’s results. However, in transition countries, although FMD is 
significant, it has a negative sign. This finding is surely inconsistent with the 
argument of Posen (1995). The reason for FMD to be significant while it has a 
negative sign is that transition countries are endowed with legal CBI in order to 
ensure the central bank commitment to price stability. Thus, in transition countries 
although financial markets are not developed enough to provide the support for 
decreasing inflation, CBI is high to establish commitment to price stability. 
Therefore, transition countries with less developed financial markets have higher 
legal CBI (See Cukierman et al., 2002). 
 
Posen (1995) states that CBI is not a significant variable in explaining 
inflation when it is used with EFOI, which has a significant effect on inflation. By 
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contrast, we find evidence supporting that CBI is also significant in explaining 
inflation when used with the FMD indicators and EFOI. Moreover, in our 
estimations, we investigate that also joint effect of CBI and FMD has a significant 
effect on decreasing inflation. Neyaptı (2003) discusses that CBI and FMD have two-
directional causality and hence one might expect CBI to lead to higher FMD. 
Especially in transition countries, when CBI and FMD are used together for 
explaining inflation, we find that CBI is significant, while FMD is insignificant. 
Surely, this finding does not support the hypothesis of Posen (1995). Nevertheless, 
the significance of FMD indicator will differ from sample to sample. 
 
As a result, findings indicate that FMD has a significant effect on CBI as 
Posen states. However, unlike Posen’s results, we find that FMD and CBI jointly 
have a significant effect on inflation. As a result, the effect of CBI on inflation 
cannot be underestimated even when used with FMD. Thus; besides FMD, CBI 
should be added as a factor for commitment of central banks to monetary policies in 
decreasing inflation. 
 
Chapter 2 gives a summary of the related literature. In Chapter 3, we explain 
the variables and the data set used in this study. In Chapter 4, we introduce the 
methodology and the equations estimated. Chapter 5 reports the empirical results for 
transition and non-transition countries. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The relation between central bank independence and inflation began to be 
rigorously addressed in the rules versus discretionary models (dynamic or time 
inconsistency models). In order to overcome high inflation, policy makers should 
make decisions about whether to apply the rules or discretionary policies or an 
optimum policy, which is a mixture of both discretionary policies and rules, as a 
monetary policy for commitment to price stability. Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
discuss that discretionary policy is not the right tool for dynamic economic planning 
since it leads to economic instability and does not provide full commitment to price 
stability. Rather, it leads to changes in the policies in each period, given the current 
situation. They also point out that any change in the decisions of the policy maker 
(simply discretionary policy) will change future expectations of the economic agents 
about the future policy decisions immediately. Thus, they indicate that policy maker 
should choose rules rather than discretionary policy in order to improve the 
economic performance in dynamic economic systems and provide full commitment 
to price stability.  
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Similarly, Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) state that central banks applying 
the rules rather than discretionary policies provide full commitment to the monetary 
policy and make the people realize this commitment and adjust their expectations 
accordingly. They indicate that this full commitment to policy brings the right 
prediction of these expectations of people by central banks. For instance, if central 
bank is independent and thus government policies do not affect the monetary policy 
for their interest, central bank can apply the rules with full commitment since there is 
no direct interference of government to short-term policies. Barro and Gordon 
(1983a) analysis is an example of a reputational equilibrium for monetary policy. 
They state that if policy maker chooses rules rather than discretion, she always has 
the option to cheat by changing from rule to discretion in order to get a benefit from 
the surprise of people. However, they add that since there is a repeated interaction 
between the agents and policy maker, it will damage the policy maker’s reputation 
and will change the expectations of people about future policies. Thus, they point out 
that the risk of losing reputation or credibility, enforces the policy maker to apply the 
rule rather than discretion in order to get a full commitment to monetary policy. 
Therefore, they state that monetary institutions that enforce rules rather than the one 
that allow discretion can decrease equilibrium rates of inflation and monetary 
growth. 
 
Taking the results of Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) and Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Rogoff (1985) also states that if the commitment of central bank to 
reduce inflation is increased, then the time-consistent average rate of inflation 
decreases. In other words, he states that if the head of central bank puts a weight on 
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inflation rate stabilization more than the society does, then the commitment of the 
central bank to price stability will help to decrease inflation. Therefore, he notes that 
his model can be an explanation why the central banks are endowed with 
independence. Moreover, he also argues that if a central bank gives more importance 
to achieve a low rate of growth for nominal variables such as price level, nominal 
GNP and money supply, then commitment of central bank to achieve these will 
decrease the time-consistent rate of inflation although these nominal variables have 
different effects on stabilization policies. Furthermore, he adds that one measure 
which central bank is isolated from inflationary pressures is to give central bank 
“political and fiscal independence”. In summary, he states that increasing the central 
bank’s commitment to price stability would decrease the time consistent rate of 
inflation and this commitment comes with fiscal and political independence. In other 
words, as also Alesina and Summers (1993) states, in Rogoff’s model, the more 
inflation-averse is the head of the central bank, the less the probability of using 
discretionary policy and the less the average inflation is, however the more the 
toleration in cyclical variability in other economic variables.  
 
Alesina and Summers (1993) and Rogoff (1985) note that time-inconsistency 
theories of inflation, developed as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983), imply that as CBI increases, likelihood of decreasing inflation 
increases. Besides, there are also studies such as Bade and Parkin (1982), Parkin 
(1987), Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), and CWN 
(1992) that empirically demonstrate that increasing central bank independence 
decreases inflation rate.  
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Bade and Parkin (1982) develop an index for central bank independence for 
12 countries that takes integer values from 1 to 4.  This measure is based on the 
political independence of the central bank. In Bade and Parkin (1982), political 
independence takes the following issues into account: the interaction and its 
frequency between the central bank and the government, appointment procedures of 
the head of the central bank, and interference of the government to the board of 
central bank. Alesina (1988) uses the same measure by including 4 more countries. 
In addition to this, Alesina (1988) discusses two related subjects. First, he determines 
the effects of competitions in the elections on macroeconomic policy and business 
cycles. Second, he determines how monetary policy is affected and changes as a 
result of the different levels of CBI.  
 
Similarly, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) develop a measure for 
central bank independence that takes “political independence” and “economic 
independence” into account. As in Bade and Parkin (1982), political independence is 
defined as the freedom of the central bank in choosing the final goals of the monetary 
policies without interference of the government. Moreover, economic independence 
is defined as the freedom of central bank in choosing and using the monetary policy 
tools for achieving these goals. Political independence includes the questions of 
whether the government appoints the head of the central bank; how long it takes to 
appoint the head of the central bank; whether the central bank law includes monetary 
stability as the objective of the central bank; whether the government interferes to the 
decisions of the central bank about monetary policies; and whether government is 
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represented on the board of the central bank. Moreover, economic independence is 
used to detect to what extent government can reach the financial sources or credit of 
the central bank in order to finance its budget deficit. Furthermore, they state that 
higher central bank independence is associated with lower level of inflation at no 
apparent cost of real economic performance, meaning that growth of real output or 
its variability does not change. Thus, they emphasize that higher CBI is beneficial in 
terms of decreasing inflation but real economic performance does not get worse. In 
other words, they imply that worse real economic performance is not necessarily the 
price of low inflation. 
 
Similarly, CWN (1992) is an important research on the topic of central bank 
independence. It develops four measures of central bank independence and tries to 
determine their relation with inflation. One measure for CBI developed in CWN 
(1992) is a questionnaire-based index for perceived actual independence of central 
bank. Indices LVAU, which is an equal-weighted index of legal independence, and 
LVAW, which is an unequal-weighted index of legal independence, consist of 4 
groups and 16 aspects for CBI. These indices give different weights to different 
characteristics of CBI and consider the following issues: independence of the head of 
the central bank, independence of central bank in its decisions about the policies, 
final aims of the central bank displayed in the law of central bank, and legal limits of 
the borrowing of government from central bank. CWN (1992) test the relation 
between CBI and inflation with a sample of 71 countries (21 countries are developed 
and 50 countries are developing) from 1950 to 1989. They find that legal 
independence is negatively related to inflation in industrial countries, but there is no 
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significant relation between CBI and inflation in developing countries. If the 
turnover rate of the head of central bank is used as the actual independence indicator, 
then CBI is significant in explaining mean and variance of inflation rate in 
developing countries and in overall sample. Although they detect a significant and 
negative relation between inflation and legal CBI in developed countries, they cannot 
detect a significant relation between CBI and inflation in developed countries when 
turnover rate is used as the CBI indicator. Of particular importance to current study, 
we use CWN (1992) index called LVAU and LVAW as CBI indicators in our 
estimations. 
 
Empirical studies in the literature have different implications for the effect of 
the relation between CBI and inflation on variability of other economic variables 
such as growth, unemployment and real interest rate. Rogoff (1985) states that the 
more inflation-averse is the head of the central bank, the less the average inflation is, 
however the more the toleration in cyclical variability in other economic variables. 
Alesina and Summers (1993) confirm the idea that as independence level of central 
banks increases, level of inflation rate and its variability decreases by using the 
extended version of the Bade and Parkin (1982) scale provided in Alesina (1988). 
However, in contrast to Rogoff (1985), they claim that while central bank 
independence brings price stability, it does not have an important effect on the level 
and variability of real economic variables such as growth, unemployment and real 
interest rates especially in OECD countries. Thus, similar to the idea of Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993) say that higher 
independence can bring lower inflation without any increase in unemployment. 
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Moreover, Alesina and Gatti (1995) add political uncertainty to the model. In fact, 
their thesis is that an independent central bank can achieve low inflation rate and low 
variability of output simultaneously. Therefore, it does not mean that higher 
independence and low inflation are associated with higher variability in real 
economic variables. 
 
Eijjfinger et al. (1998) test the relation between four measures of CBI and the 
mean and variance of macroeconomic variables such as inflation and output growth 
by using the data of 20 industrial countries for the period of 1972-1992. They look at 
the elasticity of inflation with respect to CBI and the portion of the covariance 
between the mean and the variance of inflation, which is explained by CBI. They 
find evidence that CBI decreases the mean and the variance of inflation but it does 
not affect the mean and variance of output growth.   
 
De Haan and Kooi (2000) use a proxy for CBI, which is based on the 
turnover rate of head of central bank for 82 countries and the period of 1980-1989 
similar to CWN (1992). They find evidence that there is a relation between CBI and 
inflation only when the countries that have high inflation are chosen as the sample. 
They also argue that the idea of Posen (1995), that national differences in inflation 
are the result of EFOI when used with CBI, is not supported.  
 
Another research which discusses the relation between CBI and inflation in a 
sample of transition countries is Cukierman, Miller, Neyaptı (2002)3. They introduce 
                                               
3
 Cukierman, Miller and Neyaptı (2002) will be abbreviated as CMN (2002).  
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new indices for legal independence in 26 formerly socialist economies (transition 
countries) and they state that these countries preferred to have central banks with 
higher legal independence level in the 1990s than the level, which the developed 
countries had in the 1980s. They test whether the inflation is negatively correlated 
with CBI in this sample of countries. They state that there is not a significant relation 
between CBI and inflation in the early stages of liberalization, however in the later 
stages of liberalization, when liberalization is sufficiently high; there is a significant 
and negative relation between CBI and inflation. They also note the factors like price 
decontrols, the degree of sustained liberalization and wars that are effective in 
choosing CBI level. 
 
Neyaptı (2001) analyzes the economic performance of eight eastern European 
countries4 and the level of CBI after the reforms of 1990s. She states that the CBI 
and FMD indicators have a significant relation with macroeconomic variables, 
adding that there is also a positive relation between FMD and CBI. She states that 
both CBI and FMD are positively related with price stability. Similarly, Maliszewski 
(2000) uses the sample of transition countries in his estimations. He reviews recent 
amendments in central bank laws and determines the negative relationship between 
CBI and inflation in transition countries.   
 
Besides, there are also other studies, which measure the central bank 
independence. CWN (1992) note these as: Skanland (1984), Parkin (1986), 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988), Bodart (1990), Swinburne and Castello-Branco 
                                               
4
 Eight eastern European countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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(1991), and Leone (1991). CWN also note single or multi-country case studies for 
central bank independence. Moreover, there are also other case studies concerning 
the relation between CBI and inflation. Jacome and Vazquez (2005) find evidence 
for the negative relation between CBI and inflation by using panel regressions and 
the sample of 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during 1990s. 
Similarly, Gutierrez (2003) uses Latin American and Caribbean countries and finds 
that countries that give more legal independence to the central banks in their 
constitutions are more effective in decreasing inflation than the ones, which do not. 
Panagiotidis and Triampella (2005) confirm the negative relation between CBI and 
inflation by using a time series method and the data of Greece before EMU5 
membership. They also note the relation between the variability of inflation and CBI.  
Otero and Ramirez (2004) note a case study of Colombia concerning that the central 
bank endowed with sufficient independence level after constitutional reform in 1991 
had an effect on inflation. In addition to these, Mendonça (2005) considers the 
relation between inflation and CBI through the example of Brazil.  
 
In developing countries, the relation between CBI and inflation is ambiguous 
as indicated in CWN (1992). Campillo and Mirron (1997), King and Ma (2001), 
Forder (1998) etc. claim that there is a suspicion on the robustness of the results of 
the studies for also developed countries besides developing countries. İsmihan and 
Özkan (2003) confirm this and give an explanation for this idea. They also argue the 
reasons why CBI cannot decrease inflation in some of these countries. However, 
Brumm (2006) claims that the results of the previous studies such as Campillo and 
                                               
5
 Economic and Monetary Union. 
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Mirron (1997), King and Ma (2001), Forder (1998) are spurious since they do not 
use a methodology, which takes the “measurement error” in CBI indicators used into 
account. He states that he detects a significant and negative relation between CBI and 
inflation even in the sample of developing countries once this error is taken into 
account. 
 
Posen (1995) considers CBI-inflation relation in the light of EFOI. Until 
Posen (1995), CBI is used as an exogenous variable. However, in Posen (1995), it is 
used as an endogenous variable. He states that “the assumption of exogeneity of 
monetary institutions is false”. He also adds that after Second World War, 
differences in EFOI caused national differences in CBI levels. He claims that 
political interests affect monetary policy and thus, CBI and inflation are also affected 
by EFOI. He considers the variables that determine CBI and states that the relation 
between CBI and inflation is explained by EFOI. Based on this claim, he argues that 
the stronger the EFOI, the higher the CBI. Furthermore, Posen (1995) notes that in 
CWN (1992) a reliable CBI and inflation relation cannot be detected for developing 
countries since governments in some of these countries use “inflationary monetary 
policy” regardless of CBI (which means that they support “free hand” in monetary 
policy). Thus, building on these ideas, Posen (1995) defends the idea that CBI and 
low inflation are the results of EFOI. According to Posen (1995), in fact, CBI has 
“distributive policy consequences”, thus price stability which comes with CBI, can 
be successful if it has the “political support”. He adds that if the “preferences for 
price stability” do not bring CBI simultaneously, it is not possible to observe 
negative relation between CBI and inflation in the long run. According to Posen, if 
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these preferences have a universal support, then CBI would be needless for price 
stability. He states that financial sector itself is sufficient to give the support that 
central bank independence requires and central bank independence increases, as that 
support gets stronger. He notes that if the interest groups take price stability as a 
policy goal, CBI can achieve price stability. He also adds that if a group, which has 
an interest in “anti-inflationary policy”, has an effect on “counter-inflationary 
monetary policy” and if this effect increases, CBI level increases and as a result 
inflation decreases. Hence, financial interests have preferences for price stability. 
From these ideas, he states that EFOI affects both CBI and inflation simultaneously. 
Thus, Posen (1995) concludes that CBI and low inflation are the result of EFOI 
rather than the idea that low inflation is a result of CBI. 
 
Posen (1998) questions the negative relation between CBI and inflation and 
determines the behavior of public and private sectors in a sample of 17 OECD 
countries in order to explore the effect of monetary institutions on “disinflationary 
credibility”. He states that there is no evidence that the cost of disinflation is higher 
in countries with central banks that are under the influence of political interests, than 
the ones with independent central banks. He also claims that there is no evidence that 
CBI prevents the government from collecting seignorage revenues and using the 
policies for their benefits in the election times. Therefore, Posen (1998) questions the 
hypothesis stating that the system in which increased CBI promotes lower inflation is 
the sign of credibility of commitments to price stability. 
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Neyaptı (2003) considers the relation between CBI, inflation and budget 
deficit. The hypothesis stated in Neyaptı (2003) is that budget deficits are 
inflationary when the central bank is not endowed with independence and 
development level of financial markets are not sufficient to reflect “inflationary 
expectations”. She tests this hypothesis through a panel data study of a sample of 54 
countries, which consist of developed and developing countries. The budget deficits 
affect inflation positively; however, this positive effect is the result of low level of 
CBI and FMD. She also states that budget deficits have a positive effect on inflation 
in the countries with high inflation as well as in the countries with low level of 
inflation when FMD and CBI levels are not sufficient to include the inflationary 
expectations.  
 
Taking the researches done until now as the basis, we search for the relation 
between CBI and inflation in the light of FMD. Posen (1995) uses the idea of FMD 
in order to analyze the relation between CBI and inflation. In this research, first, we 
replicate the findings of Posen (1995) by using alternative FMD indicators to EFOI 
of Posen (1995), in order to explain the negative relation between CBI and inflation. 
We use EFOI as a variable besides FMD indicators and test the hypothesis whether 
there exist a relation of CBI to FMD and inflation and test whether development 
level of financial markets affect the relation between CBI and inflation.  
 
Our contribution to the literature is therefore to test Posen’s hypothesis by 
using a larger data set than Posen and with alternative measures for FMD. Moreover, 
Posen (1995) states that CBI and the relation between CBI and inflation are the 
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results of EFOI and thus, when both CBI and EFOI are used for explaining inflation,  
the variable that has a significant effect on inflation is EFOI rather than the CBI. 
However, we find evidence supporting that there is a significant relation between 
CBI and inflation when also FMD indicators are used in the estimations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DATA 
 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use the data of Posen (1995) besides our 
data sets. Posen’s data has decade average observations from 1950 to 1989 for 32 
countries (17 OECD and 15 developing countries)6. He uses the variables of 
federalism (federal), universal banking (univbk), fractionalization (fractn), and 
regulatory power (regpow) to define, what he calls, effective financial opposition to 
inflation, EFOI. In addition, he uses dummy variables for three decades (1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s), two groups of countries (OECD and Latin America7) and fixed 
exchange rate regime (FixedX).  
 
Fractionalization is defined by Posen (1995) as the probability that any two 
randomly chosen legislators that will come from different parties. Federalism is 
defined as whether the country has a federal government system and this index takes 
                                               
6
 17 OECD countries used in Posen (1995) are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
These countries are considered to be developed countries. Moreover, 15 developing countries are 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
7
 Latin America countries are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Asian countries are 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand 
and Turkey. The dummy for Latin American countries will be abbreviated as LatinA. 
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1 if the country has a federal political system and 0 otherwise. Universal banking is 
the variable, which concerns whether the financial sectors in a country have universal 
banking system. Posen (1995) states that this variable takes 1 if “the banks are 
allowed to deal in at least two of securities, insurance, and commercial lending and 0 
otherwise”. Regulatory power is the variable measuring to what extent the financial 
sectors in a country has exposed to the central bank supervisory. Posen (1995) states 
that this variable takes 1 if “the banking supervision is not under the central bank, 0.5 
if it is shared by the central bank and another agency and 0 if it is the central bank’s 
responsibility”. Lastly, effective financial opposition to inflation index (EFOI) is 
defined as: “univbk+regpow+federal-fractn”. It ranges between -1 and 3. He 
estimates whether EFOI has an effect on each of CBI and inflation, rather than 
considering the relation between CBI and inflation directly. In the estimations run for 
the purposes of comparison with Posen (1995), we use also EFOI, FixedX and 
dummy variables used in Posen (1995). 
 
In addition to these, data set consists of the variables of CBI, alternative FMD 
indicators, inflation, and an additional dummy for Asia since we also extend the data 
set to also include more countries. FMD indicators can be listed as follows: the ratio 
of the banking sector credit to GDP (BSCRGDP), the ratio of credit provided to 
private sector to banking sector total credit (PRVTCRBS), the ratio of credit 
provided to private sector to GDP (PRVTCRGDP), and the ratio of M2 to GDP 
(M2GDP). Besides, we have interactive variables of CBI, which are explained in 
detail in Appendix 1. Moreover, as the CBI indicator, we use the equal-weighted 
aggregate index of legal independence: LVAU from CWN (1992) in the estimations 
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with 17-, 32- and 66-country data sets8. Data for FMD indicators and inflation are 
obtained from World Bank database (World Bank Development Indicators [WDI])9. 
 
We conduct our analysis in various different subsets of data. We construct 
both decade averages and annual data for 66 countries, ranging from 1960 to 1989; 
and period average and annual data of transition countries from 1989 to 1998. For 
one set of estimations, we use 17-country and 32-country10 data as in Posen (1995) 
for the purposes of comparing them with Posen’s estimations. Moreover, we also use 
a larger data set that consists of 66 countries, which include also 31 countries11 in 
Posen (1995). These 66 countries, which are documented in Table 1 in the Appendix 
2, are chosen according to the list of countries in the data of CBI taken from CWN 
(1992). We do not include transition countries in this set due to unavailability of CBI 
data for the years of 1960-1989. Besides, we have annual and period average data for 
the set of transition countries from 1989 to 1998 since transition countries have CBI 
data available only for these periods in CMN (2002). Transition countries are 
documented in Table 2 in the Appendix 2. Moreover, we have some years and 
countries where data are not available for the FMD indicators, thus panel data set is 
unbalanced. 
 
                                               
8
 We use the legal weighted aggregate index: LVAW from CMN (2002) in the estimation with 
transition countries. 
9
 BSCRGDP, PRVTCRGDP, and M2GDP have been directly taken from WDI. PRVTCRBS has been 
calculated as the ratio of PRVTCRGDP to BSCRGDP (=PRVTCRGDP/BSCRGDP).  
10
 Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, UK, US, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. First 17 countries are developed and OECD countries, rest is 
considered to be developing countries. The main criterion is development rather than the membership 
of OECD. 
11
 Only Hong Kong is excluded since no observation for any of the FMD indicators is obtained. 
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In the estimations run for comparison purposes (with 17- and 32-country 
decade average data), we use inflation and CBI taken from the data set of Posen 
(1995). However, in other estimations (with annual data and 66-country data), CBI is 
taken from CWN (1992) and we use inflation defined as 
D=[(inflation*100)/(inflation+1)]12 in order to make it range between 0% and 100% 
(as in CWN, 1992). We choose to use D to smooth out extreme values.  
 
In the estimations using annual data, we use the variables (EFOI and FixedX) 
of Posen (1995) by repeating the decade average observations for each year of that 
decade. In doing this, we assume that the variables we use (EFOI and FixedX) are 
constant for the years of the decade since they do not change frequently from year to 
year.  
 
Table 1 below displays the availability of variables used with each data set.  
 
                                               
12
 We use Consumer Price Index taken from WDI in order to calculate inflation, and inflation is used 
for obtaining the variable of D as indicated above part. Inflation is taken as a decimal number. For 
instance, if inflation is 0.1 (or 10%), the variable of D is [(0.1*100)/(0.1+1)] = 9.09%. So, we take D= 
9.09 in our estimations. FMD measures (BSCRGDP, PRVTCRGDP, PRVTCRBS and M2GDP) are 
used in a similar way. For instance, if the ratio for any FMD is, say, 0.1 (or 10%); then we take it as 
“10” in our estimations. 
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Table 1: Variables Used in Each Data Set 
 Data Sets 
Variables 
17-
country 
sample 
32-
country 
sample  
66-
country 
sample 
Transition 
countries 
sample 
CBI √ √ √ √ 
BSCRGDP √ √ √ √ 
PRVTCRGDP √ √ √ √ 
PRVTCRBS √ √ √ √ 
M2GDP √ √ √ √ 
EFOI √ √   
1960s √ √ √  
1970s √ √ √  
OECD  √ √  
LatinA.  √ √  
Asia   √  
FixedX √ √   
BSCRGDP*CBI √ √ √ √ 
PRVTCRGDP*CBI √ √ √ √ 
PRVTCRBS*CBI √ √ √ √ 
M2GDP*CBI √ √ √ √ 
EFOI*CBI √ √   
CBI*DBSCRGDP √ √ √ √ 
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP √ √ √ √ 
CBI*DPRVTCRBS √ √ √ √ 
CBI*DM2GDP √ √ √ √ 
CBI*DEFOI √ √   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
First, we replicate the estimations of Posen (1995) concerning the relation 
between CBI and EFOI. In Tables 1 and 3 of Posen (1995), he determines the 
relation between CBI and EFOI through ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
method with a decade average data set consisting of 17 OECD and 32 countries 
respectively. In Tables 2 and 4, he determines the relation between inflation and 
EFOI through weighted least square (WLS) method by using the decade average data 
set of 17 OECD and 32 countries. In the estimations with 32-country data set, Posen 
(1995) does not include the observations that have 30% or more inflation rate. All 
estimations of Posen (1995) are displayed in the Appendix 3. 
 
Posen (1995) uses a sample of data for 17 OECD countries from 1950 to 
1989 in his estimations. However, we have the data set of the FMD variables from 
1960 to 1989. Thus, for comparison purposes, we replicate the estimations in Table 1 
of Posen (1995) by using robust estimation and the data of 1960 to 1989. As a result, 
we conclude that the lack of the data of 1950s and the estimation with robust 
standard errors (White-Heteroscedasticity Corrected) do not change the results 
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extensively. Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in Appendix 3 indicate that the results and 
significance levels do not change if the estimated coefficients of variables in these 
tables are compared with the ones in Table 1 of Posen (1995) in Appendix 3.  
 
As indicated in data part, we have three types of data set for non-transition 
countries (17 countries, 32 countries, and 66 countries): 17-country and 32-country 
data sets are used for comparison to Posen (1995) estimations and 66-country data 
set is used to investigate these relations in an extended data set, with increased 
number of observations.  
 
Before proceeding with our panel estimations, we first perform Hausman 
(1978) test to decide whether we can use random effect (versus fixed effect) for 
country specific variables. Next, we test the significance of FMD indicators and 
determine whether FMD is a significant variable when used along with EFOI, in 
explaining CBI.  We test this hypothesis through OLS method with robust standard 
errors on the samples of three data sets. The equation that is estimated to test this 
hypothesis is: 
 
CBIit =α1+ α2(FMD)it + α3(EFOI)it+ α4(1960s)it 
+ α5(1970s)it+ α6(FixedX)it+ α7(OECD)it 
+ α8(LatinA.)it+ α9(Asia)it (1) 
 
By using 17-country data set, we estimate equation (1) without country 
dummy variables, as in Posen (1995), since it only includes the OECD countries. 
  26 
 
 
 
Moreover, by adding our FMD indicators, we have the opportunity to compare the 
results with Posen (1995).  
 
For the 32-country data set, we estimate equation (1) without FixedX and 
Asia dummy. Similarly, by adding alternative FMD indicators, we get the 
opportunity to compare the results with Posen’s.  
 
For the set of 66 countries, we estimate equation (1) without EFOI and 
FixedX since they are not available. Moreover, 66-country data set is used in 
addition to Posen (1995) data sets in order to utilize a larger sample to estimate the 
relations between CBI, FMD and inflation. In other words, 17-country and 32-
country data sets and the equations estimated with these data sets are used for 
comparison with Posen (1995) whereas 66-country data set is used for determining 
the relation between our alternative indicators and CBI on a larger sample. 
 
Next, we investigate the relation between inflation and CBI by using OLS 
estimation technique with robust standard errors. To do this, we use interactive 
variables as well as the rest of the control variables. The equations estimated for this 
relation are:  
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Inflationit =α1+ α2(CBI)it+ α3(EFOI)it+ α4(FMD)it 
                   α5(EFOI*CBI)it+ α6(FMD*CBI)it+ 
                   α7(OECD)it+ α8(LatinA.)it+ α9(Asia)it + 
                   α10(1960s)it+ α11(1970s)it+ α12(FixedX)it (2) 
 
Inflationit =α1+ α2(CBI)it+ α3(EFOI)it+ α4(FMD)it 
                   α5(CBI*DEFOI)it+ α6(CBI*DFMD)it+ 
                   α7(OECD)it+ α8(LatinA.)it+ α9(Asia)it + 
                   α10(1960s)it+ α11(1970s)it+ α12(FixedX)it (3) 
 
Equations (2) and (3) include the interactive variables of CBI. These are 
interaction of CBI with FMD indicators and dummy variables defined for each FMD 
indicator. We use these interactive variables in order to test the joint effect of CBI 
and FMD. The dummy variables defined for each FMD indicator are explained in 
Appendix 1.  
 
In the estimations of equations (2) and (3), we use OLS method13 with robust 
standard errors. As done in Posen (1995), we do not include the observations with 
inflation higher than 30%. He states that countries with 30% or more inflation in a 
decade can be can be considered as a hyperinflationary country. Moreover, he adds 
that in these countries, “economic structure” and “financial sectors” might gain the 
ability to adapt to hyperinflation and thus, effective financial opposition to inflation 
                                               
13
 For estimated equations of (2) and (3), we cannot get results of Hausman Test since the model and 
data do not support this test, thus we cannot determine whether we can use random or fixed effect 
model.  
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is not developed in these countries. Rather, the expected relationship between 
inflation and financial sectors change according to circumstances. 
 
In addition, it is important to note that Neyaptı (2003) discusses that CBI and 
FMD have two-directional causality and hence one might expect CBI to lead to 
higher FMD. Although we find that FMD has a significant and positive effect on CBI 
in general, two directional causality of FMD and CBI may cause endogeneity bias 
that is not addressed in this paper.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
5.1. Empirical Results for Non-transition Countries 
5.1.1. Hausman Test Results: 
 
In this part, we test whether random effect estimation model (versus fixed 
effect) is appropriate for the relation between CBI and FMD (or EFOI of Posen).  In 
order to do this, we perform Hausman test for the equations below.  
 
CBIit =α1+ α2(FMD)it (4) 
CBIit =α1+ α2(EFOI)it (5) 
 
Table 2 below displays the results of the test for equations (4) and (5) in case 
of each of the 17, 32, and 66-countries’ annual and decade average data. 
Accordingly, we generalize the results of the test and assume that the result will be 
applicable to equation (1) also.  
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Table 2a: Hausman Test Results (Fixed Effect versus Random Effect)  
Dependent variable is CBI (with decade average data) 
 17-Country Sample 32-Country Sample 66-Country Sample 
Variables chi-square p-value chi-square p-value chi-square p-value 
BSCRGDP 2131.65 0.00 641.58 0.00 1927.95 0.00 
PRVTCRGDP 1832.23 0.00 563.38 0.00 1369.82 0.00 
PRVTCRBS 409.50 0.00 418.22 0.00 5192.25 0.00 
M2GDP NA NA 85.27 0.00 631.87 0.00 
EFOI 2928.96 0.00 13120.41 0.00 NA NA 
NA: Not Applicable. 
 
Table 2b: Hausman Test Results (Fixed Effect versus Random Effect) 
Dependent variable is CBI (with annual data) 
 17-Country Sample 32-Country Sample 66-Country Sample 
Variables chi-square p-value chi-square p-value chi-square p-value 
BSCRGDP 4925.92 0.00 7184.09 0.00 34336.42 0.00 
PRVTCRGDP 5175.21 0.00 7280.31 0.00 28462.66 0.00 
PRVTCRBS 1668.77 0.00 3030.47 0.00 178526.20 0.00 
M2GDP 801.13 0.00 1841.84 0.00 14142.75 0.00 
EFOI 3548.99 0.00 NA NA NA NA 
NA: Not Applicable. 
 
According to Table 2, we state that random effect panel estimation is not 
appropriate for all of our data sets since all chi-square statistics are significant at 1% 
level. The result of Hausman test says that fixed effect is a better choice for equation 
(4) and (5) with each data set. However, in order to use fixed effect correctly, we 
should have an exhaustive data set, which will give us right results. 
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5.1.2. CBI-FMD Relationship: Decade Average Data 
 
In this part, we have the results of OLS estimation method with each of the 
17, 32, and 66-country data sets in decade averages, reported in Table 3a, 3b, and 3c, 
respectively.  
 
Table 3a: OLS estimation method with the decade average data of 17 OECD 
countries.  
Dependent variable is CBI.  
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.03 
 
(5.82)*** (5.96)*** (4.93)*** (0.35) 
BSCRGDP -0.0003       
 
(-0.73)       
M2GDP   -0.001     
 
  (-1.17)     
PRVTCRGDP     0.0003   
 
    (0.38)   
PRVTCRBS       0.003 
 
      (2.64)*** 
EFOI 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.10 
 (4.66)*** (11.01)*** (4.30)*** (4.90)*** 
1960s 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.00004 
 
(0.02) (0.55) (0.22) (0.001) 
1970s -0.02 -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 
 
(-0.51) (-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.14) 
FixedX -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
 
(-0.51) (-0.71) (-0.28) (0.13) 
No. of Obs. 51 21a 51 51 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.84 0.32 0.44 
S.E. of Reg. 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
a: We do not have 51 observations for the estimation with M2GDP due to unavailability of data 
for some of 17 OECD countries that use Euro as currency. 
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We observe that in each estimated equation EFOI is significant at 1% 
significance level as in Posen (1995). However, FMD indicators are insignificant in 
all estimated equations except for the one with PRVTCRBS, which has a positive 
sign as expected and is significant at 1% significance level. Note that the coefficient 
of PRVTCRBS indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in this variable leads to 
0.3 percentage point increase in CBI.  Moreover, no dummy variable is significant. 
 
Table 3b: OLS estimation method with the decade-average data of 32 
countries 
Dependent variable is CBI 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.15 
 (7.11)*** (6.61)*** (6.44)*** (2.64)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.0001    
 (-0.16)    
PRVTCRGDP  0.001   
  (0.99)   
M2GDP   0.001  
   (0.99)  
PRVTCRBS    0.001 
    (1.94)* 
EFOI 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (4.29)*** (4.39)*** (3.89)*** (4.90)*** 
OECD 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 (2.50)** (1.82)* (1.80)* (2.32)** 
LatinA.  0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 
 (2.29)** (2.37)** (2.45)** (2.31)** 
1960s -0.01 0.01 0.005 0.004 
 (-0.18) (0.33) (0.12) (0.13) 
1970s -0.01 0.0001 -0.004 -0.01 
 (-0.29) (0.002) (-0.15) (-0.29) 
No. of Obs. 87 86 57 86 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.29 
S.E. of Reg. 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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The estimation results in table 3b reveal that EFOI and PRVTCRBS are 
significant in explaining CBI as was the case for the formerly reported results in 
table 3a. Similarly, we cannot observe a significant effect of period dummies on CBI. 
However, we have country dummies, which are all significant. In OECD and Latin 
America countries, CBI is higher than the rest of the countries. 
 
As a result, we observe that PRVTCRBS is the only significant FMD measure 
in explaining CBI, when used along with EFOI in the estimations with 17- and 32- 
country data sets. 
Table 3c: OLS estimation method with the decade-average data of 66 countries. 
Dependent variable is CBI. 
 Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.34 
 (14.81)*** (15.13)*** (18.03)*** (14.21)*** 
BSCRGDP 0.0003      
 (0.78)      
PRVTCRGDP   0.001     
  (1.22)     
PRVTCRBS    0.00002  
    (0.30)  
M2GDP     0.001 
      (3.09)*** 
OECD -0.01 -0.02 0.0002 -0.02 
 (-0.43) (-0.80) (0.01) (-0.78) 
LatinA. -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.005 
 (-0.81) (-0.95) (-0.68) (-0.20) 
Asia -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-3.16)*** (-3.30)*** (-3.14)*** (-3.08)*** 
1960s 0.003 0.005 -0.01 -0.002 
 (0.12) (0.21) (-0.26) (-0.09) 
1970s -0.0003 -0.00005 -0.01 0.002 
 (-0.02) (-0.002) (-0.24) (0.10) 
No. of Obs. 175 173 173 140 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 
S.E. of Reg. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3c displays the results of the estimations with 66-country data set. 
According to this table, M2GDP is the only FMD measure, which is significant at 
1% level in explaining CBI. The other variable, which is also significant in all 
estimated equations, is Asia country dummy variable: in Asia, CBI is significantly 
lower than other countries. Results also draw a consistent pattern for period 
dummies. Similar to table 3a and 3b, we cannot detect a significant effect of period 
dummy variables on CBI. 
  
As a conclusion, the estimations with the FMD indicators in the data sets of 
17 countries and 32 countries reveal that PRVTCRBS has an explanatory power in 
explaining CBI besides the EFOI of Posen (1995). However, by using 66-country 
data set, we find that M2GDP is the only FMD indicator, which adds power to the 
model of Posen that explains CBI. In addition, CBI is lower in Asian countries, 
whereas it is higher in OECD and Latin American countries. Lastly, 1960s and 1970s 
do not have a significant effect on CBI.  
 
5.1.3. CBI-FMD Relationship: Annual Data 
 
Besides the estimations with decade average data, we also perform all the 
estimations with annual data of 17-country, 32-country and 66-country samples that 
are reported in Table 4a, 4b and 4c, respectively.  
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Table 4a: OLS estimation with annual data of 17 countries 
Dependent variable is CBI. 
 Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.12 
 (21.10)*** (22.21)*** (17.47)*** (3.52)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.0004       
 (-2.71)***       
M2GDP    -0.001     
    (-5.68)***     
PRVTCRGDP     0.0001   
     (0.45)   
PRVTCRBS       0.002 
       (5.77)*** 
EFOI 0.10  0.17 0.10 0.09 
 (12.00)***  (30.22)*** (11.09)*** (12.57)*** 
1960s 0.003 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.16) (-1.12) (0.92) (0.90) 
1970s -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.57) (-2.69)*** (-0.61) (-0.93) 
FixedX -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.003 
 (-1.61) (-1.18)* (-1.05) (-0.21) 
No. of Obs. 491 199 491 491 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.83 0.28 0.35 
S.E. of Reg. 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.13 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
We observe similar results in Table 4a, which reveals that EFOI and 
PRVTCRBS are significant at 1% level with positive sign in all estimated equations. 
Although we find out that M2GDP and BSCRGDP are significant at 1% level, we 
get negative coefficients for these variables. According to the theory, we can state 
that there is a positive relation between FMD and CBI. This result can be due to the 
small sample problem. 
 
  36 
 
 
 
Table 4b: OLS estimation with annual data of 32 countries. 
Dependent variable is CBI 
 Variables I II III IV 
Constant  0.26 0.22 0.13 0.25 
 (26.59)*** (23.22)*** (6.96)*** (26.39)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.0001       
 (-0.93)       
PRVTCRGDP   0.001     
   (3.06)***     
PRVTCRBS     0.001   
     (6.57)***   
M2GDP       -0.0001 
       (-0.26) 
EFOI 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 
 (13.25)*** (13.57)*** (16.12)*** (17.96)*** 
OECD 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (5.30)*** (3.05)*** (3.97)*** (4.67)*** 
Latin A. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (3.50)*** (3.79)*** (4.36)*** (3.42)*** 
1960s -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.67) (1.36) (1.01) (-1.57) 
1970s -0.004 0.01 0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.40) (0.78) (0.10) (-0.30) 
No. of Obs. 781 773 773 508 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.49 
S.E. of Reg. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Differently from the estimations above, in table 4b we have PRVTCRGDP, 
which is significant at 1% level besides PRVTCRBS when used along with EFOI. In 
addition, in OECD and Latin American countries, CBI is higher than the others. 
Moreover, any change in time variables does not have a significant effect on CBI. 
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Table 4c: OLS estimation with the annual data of 66 countries 
Dependent variable is CBI 
Variable I II III IV 
Constant  0.35 0.36 0.37 0.33 
 (43.26)*** (46.65)*** (53.50)*** (41.99)*** 
BSCRGDP 0.0004      
 (3.22)***      
PRVTCRGDP   0.0006    
   (3.89)***    
PRVTCRBS     0.00001  
     (1.26)  
M2GDP      0.001 
      (9.13)*** 
OECD -0.02 -0.03 -0.002 -0.02 
 (-1.91)* (-2.82)*** (-0.19) (-2.60)*** 
Latin A. -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.004 
 (-2.55)** (-3.08)*** (-2.01)** (-0.51) 
Asia -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-9.53)*** (-10.17)*** (-9.28)*** (-9.13)*** 
1960s 0.001 0.002 -0.01 -0.002 
 (0.12) (0.29) (-1.45) (-0.24) 
1970s 0.01 0.003 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.69) (0.47) (-0.32) (0.64) 
No. of Obs. 1642 1646 1631 1284 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11 
S.E. of Reg. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 4c displays the results of the estimations run on the sample of 66 
countries. This time, we have PRVTCRGDP, BSCRGDP and M2GDP, which are 
significant at 1% level with positive sign. Similar to previous arguments, in Asia; 
CBI is lower compared to other countries. Moreover, we also observe that OECD 
and LatinA. country dummy variables have negative effect on CBI when Asia 
dummy variable is added to model. However, we find that CBI is higher in these 
countries than the others when Asia dummy is excluded from the model (see tables 
4b and 3b).  
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In conclusion, FMD has a significant and positive effect on CBI when used 
along with EFOI. We also find that FMD is significant in explaining CBI when EFOI 
is excluded from the model (see tables 3c and 4c). Moreover, we observe that CBI is 
lower in Asia countries. OECD and Latin America countries have negative effect on 
CBI when Asia is included in the model (see table 4c), whereas their effects on CBI 
are positive when used without Asia dummy variable (see tables 3b and 4b). In 
addition, time dummy variables do not have any significant effect on CBI. 
 
5.1.4. Inflation-CBI Relationship: Decade Average Data 
 
This part investigates the relation between inflation and CBI by using OLS 
estimation technique with robust standard errors on samples of decade-average data. 
To do this, we use interactive variables of CBI as well as the rest of the control 
variables in order to test the joint effect of CBI and FMD on inflation. Moreover, we 
also test whether CBI is more effective when development levels of financial 
markets are above some level. Interactive variables defined for this test are explained 
in Appendix 1.  
 
We use inflation and CBI data taken from Posen (1995) for the estimations 
with 17-country and 32-country decade-average data sets. For the other data sets, we 
use D as the inflation. The equations (2) and (3) estimated for these relations are 
described in methodology part. Tables 5a, 5c, and 5e displays the results of the 
estimated equation of (2) and tables 5b, 5d and 5f display the results of the estimated 
equation of (3) for each data set. 
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Table 5a: OLS estimation method with the decade average data of 17 countries 
Dependent variable is inflation. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.10 0.10 0.003 0.12 
  (4.99)*** (5.79)*** (0.05) (5.92)*** 
CBI 
-0.05 -0.03 0.22 -0.11 
  (-1.14) (-0.60) (1.31) (-1.98)** 
BSCRGDP 
-0.0003       
  (-2.26)**       
PRVTCRGDP   
-0.0003     
    (-1.55)     
PRVTCRBS     0.001   
      (1.16)   
M2GDP       
-0.001 
        (-2.91)*** 
EFOI 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-2.71)*** (-3.64)*** (-1.53) (-0.31) 
BSCRGDP*CBI 0.0002       
  (0.47)       
PRVTCRGDP*CBI   
-0.0001     
    (-0.25)     
PRVTCRBS*CBI     
-0.003   
      (-1.44)   
M2GDP*CBI       0.001 
        (1.20) 
EFOI*CBI 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
  (0.80) (1.59) (0.32) (0.32) 
1960s -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (-3.79)*** (-3.43)*** (-3.22)*** (-4.87)*** 
1970s 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (4.55)*** (4.41)*** (3.81)*** (4.12)*** 
FixedX 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.14) (1.01) (1.27) (2.17)** 
No. of Obs. 51 51 51 21 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.60 
S.E. of Reg. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 5a reveals that CBI has a significant and negative effect on inflation 
when used along with M2GDP and EFOI. Thus, as opposed to Posen (1995), we find 
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that joint effect of CBI and FMD cannot be ignored. Moreover, we investigate that 
inflation is lower in 1960s whereas it is higher in 1970s, when compared with 1980s. 
We can also state that in the estimated equation with M2GDP, if the country has a 
fixed exchange rate regime, it has a higher inflation.  
 
From the results of the estimations reported in table 5b below, we cannot 
detect a significant and negative relation between CBI and inflation. However, EFOI 
and BSCRGDP are significant variables in explaining inflation. In addition, similar 
to previous argument in table 5a, we detect the same effect of decade dummies on 
inflation also in these estimations reported in table 5b. 
 
  41 
 
 
 
Table 5b: OLS estimation with the decade average data of 17 countries 
 Dependent variable is inflation. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.001 
  (6.25)*** (5.50)*** (2.77)*** (0.01) 
CBI 
-0.01 0.02 0.03 0.26 
  (-0.43) (0.47) (0.72) (1.68)* 
BSCRGDP 
-0.0002       
  (-2.47)**       
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.0002     
   (-1.23)     
PRVTCRBS    
-0.0002   
     (-0.70)   
M2GDP      0.0001 
       (0.21) 
EFOI 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
  (-2.89)*** (-4.22)*** (-2.75)*** (-1.25) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP 0.01    
  (0.52)    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 -0.03   
  
 (-1.51)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  -0.02  
  
  (-0.91)  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   -0.05 
  
   (-1.25) 
CBI*DEFOI 0.003 0.03 0.01 -0.06 
  (0.12) (1.55) (0.48) (-1.47) 
1960s -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
 (-3.66)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.13)*** (-1.99)** 
1970s 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (4.56)*** (4.47)*** (3.83)*** (5.46)*** 
FixedX 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.22) (1.18) (1.38) (0.65) 
No. of Obs. 51 51 51 21 
Adj. R2 0.51 0.56 0.50 0.58 
S.E. of Reg. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5c: OLS estimation with the decade average data of 32 countries 
Dependent variable is inflation. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.07 
  (1.86)* (2.19)** (-0.71) (1.57) 
CBI 0.16 0.15 0.49 0.22 
  (1.50) (1.54) (2.88)*** (1.99)** 
BSCRGDP 0.0001       
  (0.47)       
PRVTCRGDP   0.0001     
    (0.36)     
PRVTCRBS     0.001   
      (1.92)*   
M2GDP       
-0.001 
        (-1.15) 
EFOI 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.0005 -0.001 
  (-0.82) (-1.22) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
BSCRGDP*CBI 
-0.002       
  (-1.69)*       
PRVTCRGDP*CBI   
-0.002     
    (-1.91)*     
PRVTCRBS*CBI     
-0.01   
      (-2.48)**   
M2GDP*CBI       
-0.001 
        (-0.84) 
EFOI*CBI 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.21) (0.56) (-0.53) (-0.21) 
1960s -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-4.59)*** (-4.70)*** (-4.11)*** (-3.60)*** 
1970s 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.15) (0.92) (2.03)** (0.91) 
OECD -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (-1.89)* (-1.27) (-1.40) (-1.96)** 
LatinA. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 
 (2.21)** (2.36)** (2.47)** (1.12) 
FixedX 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.01 
 (0.72) (0.12) (0.71) (0.69) 
No. of Obs. 87 86 86 57 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.52 
S.E. of Reg. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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We observe that CBI and FMD have a joint effect on inflation since 
interactive variables PRVTCRBS*CBI, BSCRGDP*CBI and PRVTCRGDP*CBI 
are significant and negative in explaining inflation in the estimations reported in 
table 5c. In the estimation with PRVTCRBS, we have CBI that is significant at 1% 
level and positive, which is unexpected. However, if we sum the estimated 
coefficients of CBI (0.49) and PRVTCRBS*CBI (-1), multiplied with 10014, we get a 
negative total coefficient (-0.41) for CBI, as expected.  
 
Moreover, we also find that in Latin America countries, inflation is higher 
than the other countries. This finding is not a surprise for Latin America countries, 
which suffer inflation for long years. In addition, in 1960s, countries have lower 
inflation.  
 
As opposed to Posen (1995), we cannot underestimate the effect of CBI on 
inflation in the estimations. The results in table 5d below show that interaction of 
CBI with BSCRGDP, M2GDP and PRVTCRBS are significant, implying that CBI 
has a significant and negative effect on inflation when joined with FMD. In addition, 
in 1960s inflation is lower than the other years. Latin American countries draw the 
same picture for these estimations by having higher inflation than the other countries. 
 
                                               
14
 We multiply the estimated coefficient of PRVTCRBS*CBI with 100 since we express FMD 
variables as percentage points, such that the ratios are multiplied by 100 (please see the footnote (12) 
in the Data section and Appendix 5).  
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Table 5d: OLS estimation with the decade average data of 32 countries 
Dependent variable is inflation. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
  (3.66)*** (4.46)*** (3.47)*** (3.01)*** 
CBI 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.19 
  (1.62) (1.49) (2.36)** (2.41)** 
BSCRGDP 
-0.0001       
  (-1.12)       
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.0004     
   (-2.25)**     
PRVTCRBS    
-0.0002   
     (-0.82)   
M2GDP      
-0.001 
       (-2.68)*** 
EFOI 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.003 
  (-1.31) (-1.76)* (-1.50) (-0.18) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP -0.05    
  (-1.77)*    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 -0.02   
  
 (-0.75)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  -0.07  
  
  (-2.12)**  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   -0.08 
  
   (-2.16)** 
CBI*DEFOI -0.01 0.003 -0.01 -0.02 
  (-0.16) (0.08) (-0.28) (-0.30) 
1960s -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 
 (-4.45)*** (-4.44)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.92)*** 
1970s 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.33) (1.06) (1.89)* (1.13) 
OECD -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-1.81)* (-1.13) (-1.83)* (-1.32) 
LatinA 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 
 (2.23)** (2.46)** (2.22)** (0.90) 
FixedX 0.009 0.0004 0.005 0.01 
 (0.79) (0.04) (0.47) (0.72) 
No. of Obs. 87 86 86 57 
Adj. R2 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.53 
S.E. of Reg. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5e: OLS estimation with the decade average data of 66 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 12.27 11.66 9.35 15.13 
  (4.58)*** (4.65)*** (2.22)** (3.79)*** 
CBI 
-2.61 2.05 6.18 -2.33 
  (-0.34) (0.33) (0.53) (-0.22) 
BSCRGDP 
-0.03       
  (-1.04)       
PRVTCRGDP   
-0.05     
    (-1.82)*     
PRVTCRBS     0.02   
      (0.43)   
M2GDP       
-0.13 
        (-2.08)** 
BSCRGDP*CBI 0.02       
  (0.20)       
PRVTCRGDP*CBI   
-0.05     
    (-0.64)     
PRVTCRBS*CBI     
-0.11   
      (-0.77)   
M2GDP*CBI       0.11 
        (0.70) 
1960s -4.78 -5.66 -4.04 -5.26 
 (-3.87)*** (-5.03)*** (-4.03)*** (-4.32)*** 
1970s 1.56 1.03 2.02 0.88 
 (1.30) (0.95) (1.81)* (0.72) 
OECD -0.97 0.80 -1.67 -0.56 
 (-0.67) (0.65) (-1.47) (-0.45) 
LatinA 0.65 1.31 0.38 -0.52 
 (0.37) (0.79) (0.22) (-0.29) 
Asia -1.64 -0.82 -2.22 -1.49 
 (-1.20) (-0.67) (-1.71)* (-1.21) 
No. of Obs. 148 147 147 116 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.24 
S.E. of Reg. 5.43 5.23 5.40 5.56 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
  46 
 
 
 
Table 5e displays the equations estimated with 66 countries. From these, we 
cannot capture a significant effect of CBI on inflation. This finding possibly is the 
result of multicollinearity between independent variables. Appendix 4 reports the 
correlation matrix for this data set. 
 
Although we cannot detect a significant relation between CBI and inflation 
from the estimations reported in 5e, we get significant results from the ones in table 
5f below. Especially, CBI has a significant and negative effect on inflation when 
combined with FMD that is above some level. Interactions of CBI with dummies 
defined for PRVTCRBS and M2GDP support this idea by having negative and 
significant estimated coefficients. In addition, 1960s dummy draws a similar picture 
by having significant and negative effect on inflation.    
 
As a result, we can state that CBI effect on inflation is significant even when 
used with EFOI or FMD. Moreover, inflation is higher in 1970s, whereas it is lower 
in 1960s than the other years. Also compared to other countries, Latin America has 
higher inflation.  
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Table 5f: OLS estimation with the decade average data of 66 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 10.96 12.60 10.48 12.16 
  (5.63)*** (6.74)*** (5.17)*** (5.43)*** 
CBI 1.56 -0.77 3.45 5.86 
  (0.41) (-0.22) (0.78) (1.10) 
BSCRGDP 
-0.004       
  (-0.21)       
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.07     
   (-3.89)***     
PRVTCRBS    
-0.004   
     (-0.47)   
M2GDP      
-0.06 
       (-3.79)*** 
CBI*DBSCRGDP -5.27    
  (-1.61)    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 0.87   
  
 (0.24)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  -6.80  
  
  (-2.48)**  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   -7.21 
  
   (-1.84)* 
1960s 
-5.09 -5.65 -4.06 -5.29 
 (-4.10)*** (-4.93)*** (-4.06)*** (-4.20)*** 
1970s 1.20 1.07 1.78 0.83 
 (0.98) (0.96) (1.63) (0.70) 
OECD -1.06 0.82 -0.96 0.06 
 (-0.74) (0.66) (-0.90) (0.04) 
LatinA 0.55 1.39 0.89 -0.87 
 (0.32) (0.86) (0.54) (-0.49) 
Asia -1.84 -0.73 -1.87 -1.70 
 (-1.32) (-0.58) (-1.44) (-1.39) 
No. of Obs. 148 147 147 116 
Adj. R2 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.26 
S.E. of Reg. 5.39 5.23 5.33 5.50 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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5.1.5. Inflation-CBI Relationship:  Annual Data 
 
Table 6a, 6c, and 6e display the results of estimated equation of (2) whereas 
6b, 6d, and 6f display the results of equation of (3) estimated with annual data of 17, 
32 and 66 countries. 
 
Similar to previous arguments, we observe that CBI is significant in 
explaining inflation when used along with BSCRGDP, M2GDP and PRVTCRGDP 
that are reported in table 6a. Moreover, we observe the joint and negative effect of 
CBI and FMD on inflation through the interaction variables of PRVTCRGDP*CBI 
and PRVTCRBS*CBI. Moreover, similar to the results reported in above tables, 
inflation is lower in 1960s and in the countries with fixed exchange rate regime. 
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Table 6a: OLS estimation with the annual data of 17 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 13.16 12.62 2.61 14.00 
 (13.34)*** (13.57)*** (0.99) (7.86)*** 
CBI 
-5.35 -4.41 18.83 -10.98 
 (-2.36)** (-1.92)* (2.71)*** (-2.16)** 
BSCRGDP 
-0.02    
 (-2.65)***    
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.02   
  (-1.69)*   
PRVTCRBS   0.08  
   (2.71)***  
M2GDP    
-0.08 
    (-2.82)*** 
EFOI 
-2.84 -3.19 -1.05 -2.22 
 (-5.74)*** (-6.71)*** (-1.94)* (-1.37) 
BSCRGDP*CBI 
-0.04    
 (-1.32)    
PRVTCRGDP*CBI  
-0.07   
  (-2.24)**   
PRVTCRBS*CBI   
-0.27  
   (-3.38)***  
M2GDP*CBI    
-0.01 
    (-0.19) 
EFOI*CBI 5.16 6.58 0.72 6.86 
 (3.60)*** (5.21)*** (0.63) (1.92)* 
1960s -4.06 -3.96 -2.98 -1.39 
 (-8.06)*** (-7.72)*** (-6.25)*** (-2.21)** 
1970s 0.50 0.55 1.44 1.29 
 (1.21) (1.31) (3.21)*** (2.67)*** 
FixedX -0.80 -0.98 -0.66 -1.62 
 (-1.69)* (-2.16)** (-1.34) (-2.97)*** 
No. of Obs. 458 458 458 199 
Adj. R2 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.42 
S.E. of Reg. 3.43 3.39 3.51 2.64 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6b: OLS estimation with annual data of 17 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 12.07 10.94 10.07 12.63 
 (16.41)*** (15.74)*** (8.11)*** (7.79)*** 
CBI 
-2.99 -0.41 -0.30 -8.16 
 (-2.38)** (-0.30) (-0.16) (-1.67)* 
BSCRGDP 
-0.03    
 (-4.85)***    
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.02   
  (-2.13)**   
PRVTCRBS   
-0.02  
   (-1.28)  
M2GDP    
-0.08 
    (-4.75)*** 
EFOI 
-1.46 -1.65 -1.53 0.60 
 (-4.95)*** (-5.45)*** (-4.39)*** (0.89) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP 0.89    
  (0.68)    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 -4.08   
  
 (-3.20)***   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  -0.80  
  
  (-0.61)  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   2.06 
  
   (1.25) 
CBI*DEFOI 1.55 3.53 1.38 1.19 
 (1.19) (2.98)*** (1.10) (0.52) 
1960s -3.70 -3.70 -3.04 -1.37 
 (-7.47)*** (-7.41)*** (-6.32)*** (-2.15)** 
1970s 0.76 0.66 1.50 1.19 
 (1.84)* (1.60) (3.39)*** (2.36)** 
FixedX -0.87 -1.17 -0.53 -1.78 
 (-1.89)* (-2.63)*** (-1.09) (-3.19)*** 
No. of Obs. 458 458 458 199 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.41 
S.E. of Reg. 3.46 3.39 3.55 2.67 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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According to table 6b, we observe the effect of CBI on inflation in the 
estimated equations with BSCRGDP and M2GDP. Moreover, we find that joint 
effect of CBI and FMD exist through the interaction variables of CBI with 
PRVTCRBS. So, we can state that CBI is effective in decreasing inflation when 
FMD is above some level. We observe the same effect of 1960s and fixed exchange 
rate regime also in these estimations above. 
 
In the estimations with 32-country annual data set that are reported in 6c 
below, we get very significant results for CBI-inflation relation. Estimated 
coefficient of CBI is significant in almost all estimations below. Besides, we have 
PRVTCRGDP, M2GDP and EFOI, which are significant in the estimated equations 
below. Moreover, we observe that CBI and FMD are jointly significant since all the 
interaction variables are significant at 1% level below. In contrast to findings of 
Posen (1995), we cannot ignore the effect of CBI on inflation even when used with 
EFOI. Besides, we have also joint effect of CBI and FMD on inflation through the 
interaction variables. The general argument for 1960s and Latin American countries 
holds for these estimations also.  
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Table 6c: OLS estimation with annual data of 32 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 13.37 13.32 6.75 20.00 
  (11.78)*** (12.61)*** (2.49)** (8.64)*** 
CBI 
-7.32 -8.51 11.92 -18.36 
  (-2.20)** (-2.81)*** (1.50) (-2.73)*** 
BSCRGDP 
-0.01       
  (-1.24)       
PRVTCRGDP   
-0.02     
    (-1.80)*     
PRVTCRBS     0.04   
      (1.35)   
M2GDP       
-0.06 
        (-2.07)** 
EFOI 
-4.51 -4.80 -2.37 -11.26 
  (-8.19)*** (-8.43)*** (-3.96)*** (-6.24)*** 
BSCRGDP*CBI 
-0.13      
  (-4.03)***       
PRVTCRGDP*CBI   
-0.11     
    (-3.17)***     
PRVTCRBS*CBI     
-0.24   
      (-2.63)***   
M2GDP*CBI       
-0.33 
        (-3.71)*** 
EFOI*CBI 12.42 12.76 5.27 32.27 
  (8.02)*** (7.91)*** (3.64)*** (6.62)*** 
1960s -4.84 -4.64 -3.29 -4.58 
 (-9.44)*** (-9.12)*** (-6.76)*** (-7.03)*** 
1970s 0.47 0.45 1.41 0.65 
 (0.92) (0.91) (2.85)*** (1.09) 
OECD 0.75 1.08 0.20 0.11 
 (1.46) (2.14)** (0.41) (0.20) 
LatinA. 4.24 4.48 4.66 2.57 
 (4.03)*** (4.34)*** (4.47)*** (2.52)** 
FixedX -0.50 -0.89 -0.67 -0.54 
 (-1.00) (-1.79)* (-1.33) (-0.87) 
No. of Obs. 733 725 725 502 
Adj. R2 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.29 
S.E. of Reg. 5.06 4.95 5.06 5.42 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6d: OLS estimation with annual data of 32 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 10.82 10.74 12.10 10.90 
  (13.22) (14.02)*** (9.33)*** (8.58)*** 
CBI 
-3.19 -3.37 -3.05 1.05 
  (-1.36) (-1.45) (-1.30) (0.23) 
BSCRGDP 
-0.03       
  (-4.17)***       
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.04     
   (-5.09)***     
PRVTCRBS    
-0.04   
     (-2.81)***   
M2GDP      
-0.09 
       (-6.66)*** 
EFOI 
-0.71 -0.90 -1.08 0.21 
  (-2.30)** (-2.87)*** (-3.35)*** (0.30) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP -2.71    
  (-2.18)**    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 -0.66   
  
 (-0.48)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  1.43  
  
  (0.84)  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   -2.95 
  
   (-1.54) 
CBI*DEFOI 1.88 2.23 1.25 0.78 
  (1.29) (1.50) (0.83) (0.31) 
1960s -4.42 -4.17 -3.39 -4.74 
 (-8.17)*** (-7.87)*** (-6.77)*** (-6.68)*** 
1970s 0.80 0.78 1.37 0.60 
 (1.56) (1.56) (2.73)*** (0.99) 
OECD 0.74 1.05 0.03 1.13 
 (1.42) (2.02)** (0.06) (2.33)** 
LatinA. 4.28 4.55 4.31 3.07 
 (3.97)*** (4.23)*** (4.06)*** (2.75)*** 
FixedX -0.60 -0.99 -0.83 -0.09 
 (-1.16) (-1.92)* (-1.61) (-0.14) 
No. of Obs. 733 725 725 502 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.24 
S.E. of Reg. 5.15 5.06 5.11 5.62 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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According to estimations in table 6d, joint effect of CBI and FMD on 
inflation exists through the interaction variable of CBI with BSCRGDP. This implies 
that CBI is effective in decreasing inflation when development level of financial 
markets is above some level. We note that effects of 1960s and Latin America on 
inflation are same as in the estimations explained in other tables. 
 
In table 6e below, effect of CBI on inflation exists through the interaction 
variables of CBI with PRVTCRGDP and PRVTCRBS. Moreover, in table 6f below, 
we detect that this effect exist when FMD is above some level since the interaction 
variables of CBI with BSCRGDP and M2GDP are significant in explaining CBI. 
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Table 6e: OLS estimation with annual data of 66 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 10.36 9.40 7.55 12.01 
 (12.22)*** (12.12)*** (7.92)*** (9.38)*** 
CBI 0.29 4.25 6.22 1.43 
 (0.12) (2.06)** (2.22)** (0.41) 
BSCRGDP 
-0.02       
 (-2.36)**       
PRVTCRGDP   
-0.03     
   (-2.68)***     
PRVTCRBS     0.03   
     (2.83)***   
M2GDP       
-0.09 
       (-3.98)*** 
BSCRGDP*CBI 0.0004       
 (0.01)       
PRVTCRGDP*CBI   
-0.06     
   (-2.49)**     
PRVTCRBS*CBI     
-0.09   
     (-2.72)***   
M2GDP*CBI       0.05 
       (1.00) 
1960s -5.35 -5.87 -4.69 -5.51 
 (-13.58)*** (-15.43)*** (-13.34)*** (-13.13)*** 
1970s 0.14 -0.15 0.44 -0.22 
 (0.35) (-0.39) (1.14) (-0.52) 
OECD -0.14 0.97 -1.00 -0.32 
 (-0.31) (2.27)** (-2.56)** (-0.78) 
LatinA 1.14 1.54 0.83 0.09 
 (1.97)** (2.74)*** (1.46) (0.15) 
Asia -0.52 -0.18 -1.18 -0.67 
 (-1.05) (-0.37) (-2.46)** (-1.42) 
No. of Obs. 1352 1347 1341 1047 
Adj. R2 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.20 
S.E. of Reg. 5.59 5.45 5.58 5.70 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6f: OLS estimation with annual data of 66 countries 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables II III IV 
  
Constant 9.56 10.82 8.56 10.59 
  (15.11)*** (17.19)*** (14.39)*** (14.45)*** 
CBI 2.81 -0.06 5.05 5.31 
  (1.98)** (-0.04) (3.45)*** (2.85)*** 
BSCRGDP 
-0.01       
  (-1.13)       
PRVTCRGDP  
-0.06     
   (-8.38)***     
PRVTCRBS    0.001   
     (1.90)*   
M2GDP      
-0.06 
       (-7.89)*** 
CBI*DBSCRGDP -4.10    
  (-3.48)***    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP 
 1.79   
  
 (1.44)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS 
  -7.11  
  
  (-7.34)***  
CBI*DM2GDP 
   -2.75 
  
   (-1.90)* 
1960s 
-5.50 -5.81 -4.62 -5.53 
 (-13.98)*** (-15.31)*** (-13.30)*** (-12.96)*** 
1970s 0.01 -0.09 0.46 -0.25 
 (0.01) (-0.23) (1.23) (-0.59) 
OECD -0.30 0.96 -0.13 -0.12 
 (-0.65) (2.23)** (-0.34) (-0.28) 
LatinA 0.90 1.67 1.40 -0.03 
 (1.55) (3.00)*** (2.50)** (-0.05) 
Asia -0.76 -0.02 -0.77 -0.82 
 (-1.52) (-0.04) (-1.61) (-1.76)* 
No. of Obs. 1352 1347 1341 1047 
Adj. R2 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.20 
S.E. of Reg. 5.57 5.45 5.47 5.69 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
In conclusion, as opposed to the findings of Posen (1995), we get significant 
results for the relation between CBI and inflation. As a result of the estimations with 
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annual data, we find that CBI has a significant effect on inflation when used along 
with FMD. Moreover, we also detect that joint effect of CBI and FMD is significant 
in explaining inflation through interactive variables of CBI. Especially, when FMD 
level is above average, then CBI is more effective in decreasing inflation. In 
addition, we observe that inflation is lower in 1960s and higher in Latin America 
countries in all estimations.  
 
5.2. Empirical Results for Transition Countries: 
 
In this part, we perform our estimations for the sample of 25 transition 
countries, which are documented in Table 2 in Appendix 2. Similar to non-transition 
countries, we have period average and annual data of 25 transition countries. Period 
average data is constructed according to enactment year of constitution and removal 
of Ruble. According to CMN (2002), period 1 starts in 1989. For non-former Soviet 
Union countries, it ends when the first central bank law is enacted. For former Soviet 
Union countries period 1 ends with “the latest of the year of enactment of the first 
central bank law and the year of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency”. 
Period 2 starts when the first central bank law is enacted and it includes the year of 
enactment of the second central bank law, if this law exists. Period 3 starts when the 
last central bank law is enacted and ends in 1998.  
 
We perform all our tests for these two types of data set. First, we use 
Hausman test to see whether random effect model is appropriate for the sample of 
transition countries in order to detect the relation between CBI and FMD. We 
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estimate equation (4) with each FMD indicator and apply Hausman test on these 
estimations.  Based on Wald test for coefficient restriction of fixed effect model we 
decide which model (Fixed Effect Model versus OLS) is appropriate for our 
estimation with this data set. Moreover, in order to detect the relation between 
inflation and CBI, we estimate (2) and (3) with OLS method and robust standard 
errors15.  
 
5.2.1. Hausman Test Results:  
 
In this part, we have the results of Hausman test, which are displayed in Table 
7 below.   
  
Table 7: Hausman test results (fixed effect versus random effect) 
Dependent variable is CBI 
 Period-Average Data Annual Data 
 chi-square p-value chi-square p-value 
BSCRGDP 36.95 0.00 249.55 0.00 
PRVTCRGDP 27.27 0.00 165.32 0.00 
PRVTCRBS 0.81 0.37 83.11 0.00 
M2GDP 9.03 0.00 74.26 0.00 
 
According to Table 7, except for the estimated equation with PRVTCRBS 
and period average data set, Hausman test does not support the random effect model. 
Thus, we can state that fixed effect model is a better model for our estimations 
except for the one with PRVTCRBS and period average data. However, since all 
                                               
15
 Hausman test cannot be run for the estimations with interactive variables.  
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variables support fixed effect model, we adapt the same estimation to the one with 
this variable also. 
5.2.2. Wald Test Results: 
 
In this part, we estimate Equation (4) with Fixed Effect Model and each FMD 
indicator and then test whether estimated coefficient of each country specific fixed 
effect is equal to each other. Tables 8a and 8b display the results of this test. 
 
Table 8a: Wald test for coefficient restriction of fixed effects 
 Period-average data 
Variables F-statistic p-value Chi-square p-value 
BSCRGDP 0.70 0.81 16.87 0.85 
PRVTCRGDP 0.56 0.92 13.42 0.96 
PRVTCRBS 0.25 1.00 5.94 1.00 
M2GDP 0.36 0.99 8.34 1.00 
 
Table 8b: Wald test for coefficient restriction of fixed effects 
 Annual data 
Variables F-statistic p-value Chi-square p-value 
BSCRGDP 3.29 0.00 79.06 0.00 
PRVTCRGDP 2.39 0.00 57.43 0.00 
PRVTCRBS 2.03 0.01 48.65 0.00 
M2GDP 2.67 0.00 61.49 0.00 
 
According to Table 8a, we cannot reject the hypothesis stating that all fixed 
effects are equal in the estimated equation of (4) with the period average data set; 
that is, Wald test supports OLS (over Fixed Effect model) if period average data set 
is used. However, based on Table 8b, we reject the hypothesis stating that all fixed 
effects are equal in the estimated equation of (4) with annual data set. Thus, Wald 
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test supports fixed effect model if the annual data set is used as the sample. Thus, we 
use OLS with the period average data set, whereas we use Fixed Effect model with 
annual data set. 
 
5.2.3. CBI-FMD Relationship: Period Average Data 
 
In this part, we have the results of OLS estimation with period average data 
of 25 countries. Since EFOI is not available for this set, we simply estimate a model 
where FMD is used as the explanatory variable. As indicated above, we find that the 
right model which can be used with this sample of data is OLS. Table 9 displays the 
results of OLS.  
 
According to Table 9, we cannot capture a significant relation between CBI 
and FMD when this sample is used. Estimated coefficients of FMD indicators in all 
models are insignificant.  
Table 9: OLS estimation with period average data. Dependent variable is CBI. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.36 
 (6.89)*** (6.47)*** (3.57)*** (5.97)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.001    
 (-1.00)    
PRVTCRGDP  -0.0002   
  (-0.10)   
PRVTCRBS   0.001  
   (0.73)  
M2GDP    0.003 
    (1.44) 
No. of Obs. 52 51 51 41 
Adj. R2 -0.003 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
S.E. of Reg. 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.25 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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5.2.4. CBI-FMD Relationship: Annual Data 
 
In previous parts, we determine that the right model is fixed effect model for 
the sample of annual data of 25 countries. Table 10 displays the results. 
 
Table 10: Fixed Effect Model Estimation Results with annual data. 
Dependent Variable is CBI. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.53 
 (15.77)*** (12.89)*** (9.14)*** (8.65)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.003    
 (-3.85)***    
PRVTCRGDP  -0.01   
  (-2.87)***   
PRVTCRBS   0.001  
   (0.75)  
M2GDP    -0.002 
    (-0.99) 
No.of Obs. 164 157 157 142 
Adj. R-Square 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.27 
S.E. of Reg. 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.18 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
According Table 10, PRVTCRGDP and BSCRGDP are significant at 1% 
level. However, we have negative sign as the estimated coefficient of FMD indicator 
in these models. This result indicates that a country with a financial market that is 
less developed is endowed with more CBI. The reason for this, transition countries 
are endowed with more legal CBI by law since their financial markets are not 
developed enough to provide the basis for financial opposition to inflation, which is 
considered to be the factor in decreasing inflation. Thus, we can capture a significant 
but positive relation from the estimation with fixed effect model.    
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5.2.5. Inflation-CBI Relationship: Period-Average Data 
 
In this part, we determine whether there exists a significant relation between 
CBI and inflation through OLS method by using period-average data of 25 transition 
countries. Table 11 displays the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) with 
this data set. 
 
Table 11a: Results of OLS method with period-average data 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 73.61 75.36 79.28 67.27 
 (9.51)*** (10.21)*** (5.45)*** (3.89)*** 
CBI -83.59 -82.60 -85.95 -70.87 
 (-6.47)*** (-6.57)*** (-3.21)*** (-2.53)** 
BSCRGDP -0.22    
 (-1.45)    
PRVTCRGDP  -0.56   
  (-3.47)***   
PRVTCRBS   -0.25  
   (-1.22)  
M2GDP    -0.16 
    (-0.23) 
BSCRGDP*CBI 0.40    
 (1.39)    
PRVTCRGDP*CBI  0.74   
  (2.56)**   
PRVTCRBS*CBI   0.30  
   (0.85)  
M2GDP*CBI    0.13 
    (0.13) 
No of Obs. 44 43 43 38 
Adj. R2 0.40 0.43 0.39 0.35 
S.E. of Reg. 22.09 21.39 22.10 20.92 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
According to Table 11a, CBI is significant in all estimated equations. 
Besides, we have PRVTCRGDP which is also significant. Thus, we can state that 
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CBI and PRVTCRGDP are good explanatory variables in explaining inflation. In 
opposed to Posen (1995), we also detect a significant and negative relation between 
CBI and inflation even when FMD indicators are insignificant. 
 
Table 11b: Results of OLS method with annual data 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 71.72 70.57 68.30 65.60 
 (9.09)*** (9.61)*** (4.84)*** (5.66)*** 
CBI -74.09 -68.50 -60.71 -67.62 
 (-6.95)*** (-5.42)*** (-3.35)*** (-4.13)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.17    
 (-1.11)    
PRVTCRGDP  -0.31   
  (-1.85)*   
PRVTCRBS   -0.07  
   (-0.36)  
M2GDP    -0.08 
    (-0.24) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP 14.64    
  (0.77)    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP  0.89   
   (0.07)   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS   -11.22  
    (-0.61)  
CBI*DM2GDP    -1.42 
    (-0.09) 
No of Obs. 44 43 43 38 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.35 
S.E. of Reg. 22.16 21.81 22.12 20.93 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Similar to previous argument, we capture a significant and negative relation 
between CBI and inflation although no FMD indicator is significant except for 
PRVTCRGDP in table 11b. Moreover, table 11 indicates that joint effect of CBI and 
FMD through interactive variables on inflation is not significant and negative.   
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5.2.5. Inflation-CBI Relationship: Annual Data 
 
In this part, we test the relation between CBI and inflation by using OLS with 
robust standard errors and annual data of transition countries. Table 12a and 12b 
display the results of equations (2) and (3) estimated, respectively.  
 
Table 12a: OLS estimation results with annual data 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 66.97 66.40 78.90 68.28 
 (9.92)*** (9.50)*** (7.47)*** (5.39)*** 
CBI -74.43 -70.35 -83.81 -67.99 
 (-6.03)*** (-5.70)*** (-4.39)*** (-3.26)*** 
BSCRGDP -0.03    
 (-0.22)    
PRVTCRGDP  -0.13   
  (-0.50)   
PRVTCRBS   -0.26  
   (-1.64)  
M2GDP    -0.43 
    (-0.91) 
BSCRGDP*CBI 0.09    
 (0.36)    
PRVTCRGDP*CBI  0.10   
  (0.25)   
PRVTCRBS*CBI   0.27  
   (0.99)  
M2GDP*CBI    0.42 
    (0.58) 
No of Obs. 137 132 132 128 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.23 
S.E. of Reg. 24.01 24.01 23.65 23.05 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
According to the results reported in Table 12a, FMD indicators and 
interactive variables of CBI are insignificant. However, we detect a significant and 
negative relation between CBI and inflation.  
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Table 12b: OLS estimation results with annual data 
Dependent variable is D. 
Variables I II III IV 
Constant 62.54 63.03 65.09 59.20 
 (10.65)*** (10.73)*** (7.25)*** (7.61)*** 
CBI -67.10 -63.16 -58.50 -55.37 
 (-7.36)*** (-6.17)*** (-4.90)*** (-4.86)*** 
BSCRGDP 0.13    
 (1.26)    
PRVTCRGDP  0.06   
  (0.50)   
PRVTCRBS   -0.03  
   (-0.21)  
M2GDP    0.06 
    (0.33) 
CBI*DBSCRGDP -19.38    
  (-2.07)**    
CBI*DPRVTCRGDP  -13.77   
   (-1.83)*   
CBI*DPRVTCRBS   -16.93  
    (-1.47)  
CBI*DM2GDP    -19.50 
    (-1.93)* 
No of Obs. 137 132 132 128 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.24 
S.E. of Reg. 23.79 23.88 23.53 22.89 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Similarly, FMD indicators are insignificant but CBI is effective on decreasing 
inflation. Especially, the estimated coefficients of CBI and its interactive variables 
with BSCRGDP, PRVTCRGDP and M2GDP are significant. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The relation between CBI and inflation has been widely studied. However, 
until Posen (1995), the effect of the development level of financial markets on CBI 
and inflation was not considered. Posen (1995) claims that CBI and low inflation are 
the results of effective financial opposition to inflation.  Thus, he defends that rather 
than searching for the relation between CBI and inflation, relation of these variables 
to EFOI should be tested. In other words, Posen (1995) states that the relation 
between CBI and inflation exists through EFOI and puts an emphasis on the effect of 
EFOI on CBI and inflation separately.  
 
In order to test this claim, we use alternative FMD indicators. Similar to the 
findings of Posen (1995), we investigate whether FMD has a significant effect on 
CBI.  Thus, we can test whether as financial markets get developed, interest groups 
supporting price stability will be a pressure on government and this will create an 
environment for CBI to be established. However, we cannot underestimate the effect 
of CBI on inflation. Differently from Posen (1995); in our hypothesis, we claim that 
there is a negative relation between CBI and inflation and FMD is not the only factor 
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in explaining inflation. Rather, we argue that CBI, as a formal institution, will have 
an additional effect on decreasing inflation besides the effective opposition that 
arises in developed financial markets.  In other words, we claim that CBI and FMD 
represent formal institutions and informal norms that reinforce each other in reducing 
inflation.   
 
In conclusion, as a result of estimations, we find out that FMD is significant 
in explaining CBI.  More specifically, we observe that PRVTCRBS is good in terms 
of explaining CBI in the models estimated with 17-country and 32-country data sets 
in non-transition countries. In the models estimated with 66-country data set, we 
have M2GDP which is significant and has explanatory power in explaining CBI. 
However, we cannot detect a significant relationship between CBI and FMD for 
transition countries. Moreover, we observe that contribution of decade dummy 
variables to the model estimated is insignificant.  
 
In terms of the relation between CBI and inflation, we detect that CBI is a 
significant explanatory variable in the models estimated with data sets of non-
transition countries. Moreover, from the estimations with interactive variables, we 
observe that joint effect of CBI and FMD on inflation is significant in explaining 
inflation. So, we observe that CBI is effective in decreasing inflation when it is 
combined with FMD. Thus, as opposed to Posen (1995), we find that both FMD and 
CBI have effect on inflation. Nevertheless, as determined also in CMN (2002), we 
find that CBI has explanatory power in explaining inflation in transition countries 
also. In the estimations with period average data, the estimated coefficients of CBI 
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and PRVTCRGDP are significant and in the estimations with annual data, we 
observe that the joint effect of CBI and FMD on inflation is generally significant. We 
also find that inflation is higher in Latin American countries, on average, than the 
others. In addition, inflation in the 1960s is lower than the other years.  
 
As a conclusion, we have findings supporting the argument of Posen stating 
that developed financial markets have a significant role in establishing CBI and 
decreasing inflation. Moreover, unlike Posen, we have evidence supporting that CBI 
as a formal institution has a significant effect on decreasing inflation when used with 
FMD. Especially in transition countries, CBI is more effective in decreasing inflation 
as compared to FMD, since transition countries do not have developed financial 
markets which will create an environment for decreasing inflation. In these countries, 
CBI is the formal institution which provides commitment to price stability and 
encourages the persistence of this commitment rather than FMD. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
DUMMY VARIABLES FOR FMD MEASURES 
 
 
We define dummy variables for each FMD indicator and each data set. First 
we take the average of each FMD indicator in each data set. Averages are following: 
 
Table 1: Averages of Data 
 Decade-average data Annual Data 
 
 
Variables 
17-
country 
sample 
32-
country 
sample 
66-
country 
sample 
17-
country 
sample 
32-
country 
sample 
66-
country 
sample 
BSCRGDP 71.98 56.59 49.91 71.43 56.81 50.84 
PRVTCRGDP 59.50 46.28 39.38 58.73 46.87 38.96 
PRVTCRBS 80.94 78.65 72.28 80.25 79.83 72.07 
M2GDP 56.09 37.15 35.20 56.58 38.35 35.15 
EFOI 1.05 0.92  1.05 0.92  
 
Dummy variable for each FMD is defined as: 
DFMD : 1 if the observation in FMDij is higher than the average of FMDij  
0 otherwise. 
given i = EFOI, PRVTCRGDP, PRVTCRBS, M2GDP and BSCRGDP and j = 17-
country, 32-country, 66-country decade average and annual data sets. According to 
that: 
The interactive variables are defined as: 
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• CBI*DBSCRGDP = Interaction of CBI with dummy variable defined for 
BSCRGDPj where j= each sample of data 
• CBI*DPRVTCRGDP = Interaction of CBI with dummy variable defined for 
PRVTCRGDPj where j= each sample of data 
• CBI*DPRVTCRBS = Interaction of CBI with dummy variable defined for 
PRVTCRBSj where j= each sample of data 
• CBI*DM2GDP = Interaction of CBI with dummy variable defined for M2GDPj 
where j= each sample of data 
• CBI*DEFOI = Interaction of CBI with dummy variable defined for EFOIj 
where j= each sample of data 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
COUNTRIES IN DATA SETS 
 
 
Table 1: List of 66 Countries  
1 Argentina 23 Honduras 45 Pakistan 
2 Australia 24 Iceland 46 Panama 
3 Austria 25 India 47 Peru 
4 Bahamas 26 Indonesia 48 Philippines 
5 Barbados 27 Ireland 49 Portugal 
6 Belgium 28 Israel 50 Qatar 
7 Bolivia 29 Italy 51 Samoa 
8 Botswana 30 Japan 52 Singapore 
9 Brazil 31 Kenya 53 South Africa 
10 Canada 32 Korea, Rep. 54 Spain 
11 Chile 33 Lebanon 55 Sweden 
12 China 34 Luxembourg 56 Switzerland 
13 Colombia 35 Malaysia 57 Tanzania 
14 Costa Rica 36 Malta 58 Thailand 
15 Denmark 37 Mexico 59 Turkey 
16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 38 Morocco 60 Uganda 
17 Ethiopia 39 Nepal 61 United Kingdom 
18 Finland 40 Netherlands 62 United States 
19 France 41 New Zealand 63 Uruguay 
20 Germany 42 Nicaragua 64 Venezuela, RB 
21 Ghana 43 Nigeria 65 Zambia 
22 Greece 44 Norway 66 Zimbabwe 
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Table 2: List of Transition Countries 
1 Albania 14 Lithuania 
2 Armenia 15 Macedonia, FYR 
3 Azerbaijan 16 Moldova 
4 Belarus 17 Mongolia 
5 Bulgaria 18 Poland 
6 Croatia 19 Romania 
7 Czech Republic 20 Russian Federation 
8 Estonia 21 Slovak Republic 
9 Georgia 22 Slovenia 
10 Hungary 23 Tajikistan 
11 Kazakhstan 24 Turkmenistan 
12 Kyrgyz Republic 25 Ukraine 
13 Latvia   
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APPENDIX 3 
 
POSEN’S ESTIMATIONS 
 
 
Table 1 of Posen (1995): OLS model estimated with decade-
average data of 17 countries. Dependent variable is CBI 
 I II III IV 
Constant 0.26 
(10.89)*** 
0.32 
(11.21)*** 
0.28  
(5.14)*** 
0.33  
(6.36)*** 
EFOI 0.12 
(6.65)***  
0.12  
(6.43)***  
Univbk 
 
0.20  
(6.15)***  
0.20 
(5.97)*** 
Regpow 
 
0.06  
(1.74)*  
0.06 
(1.62) 
Federal 
 
0.13  
(4.21)***  
0.13 
(3.93)*** 
Fractn 
 
-0.54 
(-3.32)***  
-0.53 
(-3.14)*** 
1950s 
  
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
1960s 
  
0.01  
(0.18) 
0.01  
(0.30) 
1970s 
  
-0.01  
(-0.21) 
-0.02  
(-0.32) 
FixedX 
  
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
-0.03 
(-0.53) 
No. of Obs. 68 68 68 68 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.45 
S.E. Reg. 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
This table is the re-estimation of table 1 of Posen (1995) with his data 
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Table 2 of Posen (1995): Weigted Least Square model (by period) 
estimated with decade-average data of 17 countries. Dependent 
variable is inflation 
 I II III IV 
Constant 0.086 
(8.60)*** 
0.087 
(7.25)*** 
0.06 
(5.45)*** 
0.062 
(4.77)*** 
EFOI -0.015 
(-3.00)***  
-0.015 
(-3.75)***  
Univbk 
 
-0.001 
(-0.10)  
-0.009 
(-1.00) 
Regpow 
 
-0.024 
(-2.67)***  
-0.021 
(-3.00)*** 
Federal 
 
-0.019 
(-2.38)**  
-0.014 
(-2.00)** 
Fractn 
 
0.053 
(1.23)  
0.039 
(1.05) 
CBI 0.002 
(0.07) 
-0.007 
(-0.23) 
0.008 
(0.35) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
FixedX -0.023 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.028 
(-4.00)*** 
0.019 
(2.11)** 
0.013 
(1.30) 
1950s 
  
-0.033 
(-3.00)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.72)*** 
1960s 
  
-0.031 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.029 
(-3.22)*** 
1970s 
  
0.037 
(4.11)*** 
0.034 
(3.78)*** 
No. of Obs. 68 68 68 68 
Adj. R2 0.227 0.284 0.475 0.47 
S.E. Reg. 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.024 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level. Only estimations with CBI are included in 
this table for comparison purposes to our estimations. This table is directly taken 
from Posen (1995). 
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Table 3 of Posen (1995): OLS model estimated with decade-average data of 32 
countries. Dependent variable is CBI 
 I  II III IV V VI 
Constant 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.16 
 (11.20)*** (7.84)*** (6.76)*** (3.96)*** (5.50)*** (3.50)*** 
EFOI 0.09  0.08  0.08  
 (4.62)***  (4.29)***  (4.22)***  
Univbk  0.12  0.12  0.12 
  (3.58)***  (3.86)***  (3.79)*** 
Regpow  0.08  0.01  0.01 
  (2.30)**  (0.25)  (0.24) 
Federal  0.09  0.11  0.11 
  (2.56)**  (3.56)***  (3.51)*** 
Fractn  -0.02  0.02  0.02 
  (-0.29)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
OECD   0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 
   (2.95)*** (3.97)*** (2.91)*** (3.92)*** 
LatinA.   0.17 0.21 0.17 0.21 
   (3.42)*** (3.90)*** (3.38)*** (3.85)*** 
1960s     -0.01 -0.002 
     (-0.15) (-0.07) 
1970s     -0.01 -0.01 
     (-0.18) (-0.18) 
No. of Obs. 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Adj. R2 0.19 0.18 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.32 
S.E. of Reg. 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. This table is re-estimation of table 3 
of Posen (1995) with his data 
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Table 4 of Posen (1995): Weighted Least Square Model estimated with decade-
average data of 32 countries. Dependent variable is CBI 
 I  II III IV V VI 
Constant 0.079 0.063 0.086 0.085 0.076 0.08 
 (5.64)*** (4.20)*** (6.61)*** (5.67)*** (5.07)*** (6.15)*** 
EFOI -0.018  -0.013  -0.013  
 (-2.25)**  (-1.86)  (-2.17)**  
Univbk  -0.004  0.004  0.000 
  (-0.33)  (0.36)  (0.00) 
Regpow  -0.001  -0.008  -0.008 
  (-0.08)  (-0.67)  (-0.73) 
Federal  -0.034  -0.03  -0.025 
  (-2.83)***  (-2.73)***  (-2.50)** 
Fractn  0.081  0.025  0.032 
  (3.00)***  (0.93)  (1.33) 
CBI 0.073 0.057 0.049 0.041 0.043 0.05 
 (1.87) (1.54) (1.32) (1.11) (1.26) (1.52) 
FixedX -0.015 -0.016 -0.01 -0.014 0.006 0.009 
 (-1.25) (-1.45) (-1.00) (-1.40) (0.60) (0.90) 
OECD   -0.024 -0.023 -0.025 -0.027 
   (-2.00)** (-1.64) (-2.08)** (-2.45)** 
LatinA.   0.064 0.057 0.058 0.065 
   (3.56)*** (2.85)*** (3.22)*** (4.06)*** 
1960s     -0.038 -0.04 
     (-3.17)*** (-3.33)*** 
1970s     0.022 0.023 
     (2.20)** (2.30)** 
No. of Obs. 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Adj. R2 0.045 0.160 0.303 0.334 0.464 0.445 
S.E. of Reg. 0.054 0.051 0.046 0.045 0.040 0.041 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** indicates 
significant at 5% level. This table is directly taken from Posen (1995) 
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Table 1.1: Replication of Table 1 of Posen (1995) without 1950s 
Dependent variable is CBI 
 I II III IV 
Constant 0.27 
(9.44)*** 
0.32  
(9.51)*** 
0.28 
(5.02)*** 
0.34 
(6.03)*** 
EFOI 0.12 
(5.57)***  
0.12 
(5.38)***  
Univbk 
 
0.19  
(5.10)***  
0.20 
(4.96)*** 
Regpow 
 
0.06  
(1.49)   
0.06  
(1.38) 
Federal 
 
0.13  
(3.33)***  
0.12 
(3.04)*** 
Fractn 
 
-0.54 
(-2.78)***  
-0.53 
(-2.61)** 
1960s 
  
0.01  
(0.18) 
0.02  
(0.30) 
1970s 
  
-0.01  
(-0.22) 
-0.02  
(-0.36) 
FixedX 
  
-0.02 
(-0.36) 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
No. of Obs. 51 51 51 51 
Adj. R2 0.38 0.45 0.34 0.42 
S.E. Reg. 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; ** 
indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table1.2: Replication of Table 1 of Posen (1995) with robust 
estimation. Dependent variable is CBI. 
 I II III IV 
Constant 0.26 
(12.97)*** 
0.32 
(13.94)*** 
0.28 
(6.07)*** 
0.33 
(6.56)*** 
EFOI 0.12 
(6.13)***  
0.12 
(6.10)***  
Univbk 
 
0.20 
(6.67)***  
0.20 
(7.03)*** 
Regpow 
 
0.06 
(1.44)   
0.06  
(1.38) 
Federal 
 
0.13 
(4.01)***  
0.13  
(3.69)*** 
Fractn 
 
-0.54 
(-3.96)***  
-0.53 
(-3.88)*** 
1950s  
  
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
1960s 
  
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01  
(0.28) 
1970s 
  
-0.01  
(-0.25) 
-0.02  
(-0.36) 
FixedX 
  
-0.02 
(-0.36) 
-0.03 
(-0.51) 
No. of Obs. 68 68 68 68 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.45 
S.E. Reg. 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table1.3: Replication of Table 1 of Posen (1995) without 1950s 
and with robust estimation. Dependent variable is CBI. 
 I II III IV 
Constant 0.27 
(11.13)*** 
0.32 
(11.85)*** 
0.28 
(5.72)*** 
0.34 
(6.17)*** 
EFOI 0.12 
(4.88)***  
0.12 
(4.84)***  
Univbk 
 
0.19 
(5.64)***  
0.20 
(6.06)*** 
Regpow 
 
0.06 
(1.28)   
0.06 
(1.22) 
Federal 
 
0.13 
(3.19)***  
0.12  
(2.83)*** 
Fractn. 
 
-0.54 
(-3.41)***  
-0.53 
(-3.31)*** 
1960s 
  
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
1970s 
  
-0.01  
(-0.26) 
-0.02  
(-0.4) 
FixedX 
  
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.04 
(-0.54) 
No. of Obs. 51 51 51 51 
Adj. R2 0.38 0.45 0.34 0.42 
S.E. Reg. 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; *** indicates significant at 1% level; 
** indicates significant at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
CORRELATION MATRICES 
 
 
 Table 1 displays the correlation matrix of the variables for the annual data of 
66 countries and table 2 is the correlation matrix of the same variables for decade-
average data of 66 countries. 
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Table 1: For annual data of 66 countries 
Variables X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1   (BSCRGDP) 1.00 0.78 0.09 0.68 0.40 0.17 0.59 -0.02 0.18 0.00 0.55 0.44 0.06 0.09 0.86 0.67 
X2   (BSCRGDP*CBI)  1.00 0.61 0.81 0.50 0.39 0.72 0.01 0.51 -0.03 0.54 0.69 0.06 0.20 0.68 0.89 
X3   (CBI)   1.00 0.39 0.24 0.40 0.37 0.06 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.56 0.00 0.23 0.10 0.56 
X4   (CBI*DBSCRGDP)    1.00 0.44 0.37 0.75 -0.05 0.36 0.00 0.49 0.55 0.04 0.14 0.62 0.74 
X5   (CBI*DM2GDP)     1.00 0.28 0.43 -0.13 0.39 -0.10 0.73 0.75 0.04 0.10 0.44 0.51 
X6   (CBI*DPRVTCRBS)      1.00 0.59 -0.23 0.26 0.03 0.32 0.42 0.23 0.34 0.45 0.62 
X7   (CBI*DPRVTCRGDP)       1.00 -0.11 0.35 0.04 0.53 0.57 0.11 0.22 0.73 0.82 
X8   (D)        1.00 0.00 -0.20 -0.28 -0.19 -0.08 -0.08 -0.19 -0.15 
X9   (EFOI)         1.00 -0.08 0.31 0.61 -0.05 0.36 0.15 0.47 
X10  (FixedX)          1.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
X11  (M2GDP)           1.00 0.89 0.07 0.11 0.64 0.59 
X12  (M2GDP*CBI)            1.00 0.05 0.16 0.50 0.72 
X13  (PRVTCRBS)             1.00 0.97 0.14 0.11 
X14  (PRVTCRBS*CBI)              1.00 0.17 0.26 
X15  (PRVTCRGDP)               1.00 0.81 
X16  (PRVTCRGDP*CBI)                1.00 
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Table 2: For decade-average data of 66 countries 
Variables X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1   (BSCRGDP) 1.00 0.78 0.08 0.67 0.35 0.22 0.58 -0.04 0.18 -0.01 0.43 0.35 0.15 0.20 0.83 0.64 
X2   (BSCRGDP*CBI)  1.00 0.61 0.80 0.44 0.44 0.70 0.00 0.53 -0.03 0.43 0.60 0.15 0.39 0.66 0.87 
X3   (CBI)   1.00 0.41 0.23 0.44 0.37 0.07 0.46 0.00 0.18 0.54 0.00 0.40 0.09 0.57 
X4   (CBI*DBSCRGDP)    1.00 0.36 0.37 0.76 -0.05 0.42 0.05 0.37 0.45 0.09 0.26 0.62 0.73 
X5   (CBI*DM2GDP)     1.00 0.27 0.35 -0.14 0.41 -0.10 0.71 0.74 0.08 0.17 0.42 0.48 
X6   (CBI*DPRVTCRBS)      1.00 0.56 -0.29 0.34 0.07 0.32 0.43 0.42 0.58 0.47 0.64 
X7   (CBI*DPRVTCRGDP)       1.00 -0.14 0.40 0.08 0.50 0.54 0.19 0.34 0.74 0.83 
X8   (D)        1.00 0.01 -0.22 -0.32 -0.23 -0.20 -0.15 -0.23 -0.18 
X9   (EFOI)         1.00 -0.09 0.31 0.60 -0.05 0.40 0.15 0.48 
X10  (FixedX)          1.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
X11  (M2GDP)           1.00 0.90 0.06 0.11 0.62 0.58 
X12  (M2GDP*CBI)            1.00 0.03 0.22 0.50 0.71 
X13  (PRVTCRBS)             1.00 0.91 0.26 0.21 
X14  (PRVTCRBS*CBI)              1.00 0.28 0.44 
X15  (PRVTCRGDP)               1.00 0.81 
X16  (PRVTCRGDP*CBI)                1.00 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
DATA 
 
 
 In this part, we have decade and period-average data used in the estimations. 
Table 1 displays the decade-average data of 66 countries and table 2 is the period-
average data of 25 transition countries. 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1960s Argentina 19.90 13.28 16.02 66.37 NA 18.10 0.00 1.50 
1970s Argentina 27.13 18.27 16.56 67.40 0.44 53.64 0.00 1.32 
1980s Argentina 45.11 26.16 14.35 58.75 0.44 69.27 0.00 0.61 
1960s Australia 41.53 20.62 42.59 49.70 0.31 2.70 1.00 0.88 
1970s Australia 40.14 25.10 37.58 62.53 0.31 9.87 0.00 0.88 
1980s Australia 46.21 34.56 36.94 73.71 0.31 7.73 0.00 0.88 
1960s Austria 45.35 39.20 NA 86.54 0.68 3.55 1.00 0.96 
1970s Austria 68.18 56.78 NA 83.65 0.58 6.06 0.00 0.96 
1980s Austria 101.74 77.69 NA 76.62 0.58 3.66 0.00 0.96 
1960s Bahamas 64.30 54.39 34.07 84.78 NA 5.58 NA NA 
1970s Bahamas 80.34 50.14 34.69 65.93 0.45 6.73 NA NA 
1980s Bahamas 50.80 40.07 31.48 79.01 0.45 5.85 NA NA 
1960s Barbados 42.52 41.57 45.58 97.59 NA 5.95 NA NA 
1970s Barbados 42.70 38.90 39.98 91.81 0.40 12.84 NA NA 
1980s Barbados 50.31 38.69 42.34 77.06 0.40 6.29 NA NA 
1960s Belgium 37.72 14.96 NA 39.29 0.18 3.03 1.00 1.81 
1970s Belgium 44.38 24.66 NA 55.43 0.19 7.23 0.00 1.81 
1980s Belgium 65.33 29.38 NA 45.14 0.19 4.60 1.00 2.81 
1960s Bolivia 14.53 4.85 10.44 31.07 0.25 5.01 1.00 0.53 
1970s Bolivia 20.69 13.51 15.02 66.35 0.25 14.21 1.00 1.00 
1980s Bolivia 27.20 17.75 14.06 81.89 0.25 49.01 0.00 0.35 
1960s Botswana NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1970s Botswana 5.46 15.58 16.80 464.77 0.36 10.33 NA NA 
1980s Botswana -18.17 10.24 23.41 -22.98 0.36 9.71 NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1960s Brazil 27.01 19.66 16.77 71.09 0.26 NA 1.00 0.52 
1970s Brazil 57.90 49.82 14.16 86.20 0.26 NA 0.00 1.64 
1980s Brazil 84.29 47.52 11.67 58.31 0.26 66.88 0.00 1.42 
1960s Canada 44.23 33.98 35.31 76.61 0.46 2.66 1.00 1.88 
1970s Canada 61.06 53.06 39.75 86.71 0.46 7.77 0.00 1.88 
1980s Canada 74.81 67.53 44.05 90.24 0.46 6.03 0.00 1.88 
1960s Chile 20.49 11.63 13.04 57.98 0.22 20.35 0.00 0.19 
1970s Chile 47.11 16.54 14.67 37.49 0.49 56.63 0.00 1.70 
1980s Chile 85.80 63.58 32.39 77.28 0.49 17.33 1.00 2.00 
1960s China NA NA NA NA 0.29 NA NA NA 
1970s China 42.31 51.17 25.79 122.50 0.29 NA NA NA 
1980s China 67.06 66.49 47.97 99.27 0.29 12.67 NA NA 
1960s Colombia 30.96 21.61 17.71 69.60 NA 9.69 0.00 1.50 
1970s Colombia 34.30 24.90 17.51 71.89 NA 17.98 0.00 1.37 
1980s Colombia 34.74 27.09 18.19 76.07 NA 18.93 0.00 1.48 
1960s Costa Rica 32.27 26.65 19.60 82.66 0.42 2.33 NA NA 
1970s Costa Rica 37.47 28.21 27.83 77.41 0.42 9.62 NA NA 
1980s Costa Rica 40.67 20.12 37.45 49.70 0.42 19.45 NA NA 
1960s Denmark 49.57 47.70 44.54 96.34 0.47 5.52 1.00 1.75 
1970s Denmark 46.25 46.96 41.20 101.57 0.47 9.10 0.00 1.75 
1980s Denmark 57.52 45.70 50.05 79.62 0.47 6.39 1.00 1.75 
1960s Egypt 51.91 19.50 34.64 37.91 0.53 2.91 NA NA 
1970s Egypt 67.13 18.63 41.64 27.97 0.53 8.06 NA NA 
1980s Egypt 111.65 31.67 77.34 28.07 0.53 14.70 NA NA 
1960s Ethiopia NA NA NA NA NA 1.79 NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1970s Ethiopia NA NA NA NA 0.47 9.82 NA NA 
1980s Ethiopia 34.46 10.62 19.27 30.98 0.47 3.92 NA NA 
1960s Finland 41.90 40.24 NA 96.06 0.27 4.83 NA NA 
1970s Finland 42.26 44.87 NA 106.30 0.27 10.49 NA NA 
1980s Finland 59.33 61.98 NA 104.38 0.27 6.75 NA NA 
1960s France 68.24 54.73 NA 79.77 0.40 3.98 1.00 0.80 
1970s France 89.10 75.19 NA 83.91 0.28 8.83 0.00 0.80 
1980s France 102.85 91.55 NA 88.96 0.28 6.73 1.00 0.80 
1960s Germany 64.49 63.49 NA 98.44 0.66 NA 1.00 2.43 
1970s Germany 75.02 68.83 NA 92.10 0.66 NA 0.00 2.43 
1980s Germany 95.43 81.36 NA 85.26 0.66 NA 1.00 2.43 
1960s Ghana 20.51 7.86 19.31 29.50 0.28 7.03 NA NA 
1970s Ghana 29.91 5.52 21.19 18.70 0.28 28.71 NA NA 
1980s Ghana 22.08 2.85 12.58 12.89 0.28 29.05 NA NA 
1960s Greece 24.80 17.29 NA 69.72 0.50 2.10 1.00 0.87 
1970s Greece 43.15 28.71 NA 66.84 0.51 12.54 0.00 0.87 
1980s Greece 85.71 42.13 NA 50.22 0.51 16.22 1.00 0.87 
1960s Honduras 21.25 15.80 15.09 72.96 0.41 2.26 NA NA 
1970s Honduras 36.90 29.53 22.00 80.10 0.41 7.03 NA NA 
1980s Honduras 50.63 32.42 25.60 64.47 0.41 6.74 NA NA 
1960s Iceland 39.74 37.00 34.40 93.24 0.36 9.89 NA NA 
1970s Iceland 31.51 27.56 23.32 87.68 0.36 24.89 NA NA 
1980s Iceland 40.32 37.06 21.78 92.30 0.36 26.75 NA NA 
1960s India 24.43 10.59 20.37 43.20 0.33 5.55 0.00 1.53 
1970s India 32.58 18.63 26.16 56.74 0.33 7.00 0.00 1.52 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1980s India 50.72 28.26 36.84 55.87 0.33 8.32 0.00 1.44 
1960s Indonesia 11.40 NA 8.93 NA 0.34 44.00 1.00 0.11 
1970s Indonesia 16.33 NA 12.87 NA 0.32 15.33 1.00 0.36 
1980s Indonesia 17.83 18.83 20.34 106.97 0.32 8.68 0.00 0.42 
1960s Ireland 33.87 29.90 NA 89.27 0.39 4.86 1.00 0.89 
1970s Ireland 36.67 38.44 NA 105.02 0.39 12.00 0.00 0.89 
1980s Ireland 53.71 43.68 NA 83.29 0.39 8.23 1.00 0.89 
1960s Israel 30.07 21.49 36.95 75.90 0.42 5.74 NA NA 
1970s Israel 87.82 48.12 30.21 57.05 0.42 26.62 NA NA 
1980s Israel 151.25 63.86 61.00 43.28 0.42 45.85 NA NA 
1960s Italy 79.02 62.93 NA 79.71 0.22 3.92 1.00 -0.23 
1970s Italy 103.97 70.51 NA 67.81 0.22 12.25 0.00 -0.23 
1980s Italy 87.83 52.28 NA 59.52 0.22 9.84 1.00 -0.23 
1960s Japan 90.44 83.99 68.29 93.34 0.16 5.49 1.00 0.43 
1970s Japan 158.39 130.78 80.62 82.86 0.16 8.51 0.00 0.43 
1980s Japan 208.31 155.93 93.10 74.68 0.16 2.43 0.00 0.43 
1960s Kenya 15.12 13.65 15.65 94.83 0.44 2.00 NA NA 
1970s Kenya 30.64 22.62 27.76 74.45 0.44 11.28 NA NA 
1980s Kenya 48.37 30.17 27.59 62.84 0.44 10.42 NA NA 
1960s Korea 27.39 23.92 17.06 84.92 0.26 11.24 1.00 -0.18 
1970s Korea 45.17 40.96 28.27 90.67 0.27 12.99 1.00 -0.48 
1980s Korea 59.46 55.08 31.71 92.65 0.23 7.23 1.00 0.76 
1960s Lebanon NA NA NA NA 0.37 0.00 NA NA 
1970s Lebanon NA NA NA NA 0.37 0.00 NA NA 
1980s Lebanon -70.67 60.05 153.14 -99.47 0.37 0.00 NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1960s Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA 2.69 NA NA 
1970s Luxembourg 79.04 79.04 NA 100.00 NA 6.46 NA NA 
1980s Luxembourg 104.67 104.35 NA 99.68 NA 4.41 NA NA 
1960s Malaysia 14.55 12.68 26.23 88.10 0.34 0.96 0.00 1.00 
1970s Malaysia 48.94 31.57 37.84 66.29 0.34 5.88 0.00 0.47 
1980s Malaysia 105.17 72.13 58.38 69.15 0.34 3.45 0.00 0.73 
1960s Malta 35.04 27.23 142.00 75.71 0.45 1.77 NA NA 
1970s Malta 43.14 36.79 158.28 87.29 0.45 5.76 NA NA 
1980s Malta 49.12 50.18 132.50 104.72 0.45 3.20 NA NA 
1960s Mexico 33.61 26.46 25.30 79.66 0.36 2.87 0.00 0.84 
1970s Mexico 45.33 26.50 28.99 58.74 0.36 14.28 0.00 1.99 
1980s Mexico 50.16 14.67 21.99 30.30 0.36 37.96 0.00 1.66 
1960s Morocco 26.29 15.25 27.59 59.08 0.16 2.36 NA NA 
1970s Morocco 45.68 25.41 35.82 55.88 0.16 8.17 NA NA 
1980s Morocco 61.79 23.39 42.04 38.05 0.16 6.93 NA NA 
1960s Nepal 1.68 1.93 8.41 123.98 0.25 4.82 NA NA 
1970s Nepal 10.24 4.77 15.50 52.11 0.25 7.21 NA NA 
1980s Nepal 25.76 9.87 25.41 38.70 0.25 9.66 NA NA 
1960s Netherlands 47.54 44.91 NA 94.02 0.42 4.36 1.00 0.70 
1970s Netherlands 61.65 68.97 NA 111.54 0.42 6.88 0.00 0.70 
1980s Netherlands 85.47 83.83 NA 99.80 0.42 2.75 1.00 0.70 
1960s New Zealand 19.21 14.72 23.39 77.42 0.27 4.15 1.00 0.00 
1970s New Zealand 24.95 18.08 24.11 74.14 0.27 10.82 0.00 0.00 
1980s New Zealand 39.72 33.64 32.79 82.76 0.27 10.61 0.00 0.00 
1960s Nicaragua 20.35 18.97 14.37 93.23 0.42 NA NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1970s Nicaragua 29.12 27.24 18.94 95.19 0.42 12.84 NA NA 
1980s Nicaragua 77.19 28.03 35.20 38.43 0.42 55.81 NA NA 
1960s Nigeria 9.67 6.02 10.61 80.33 0.33 4.77 NA NA 
1970s Nigeria 11.81 7.74 15.44 25.09 0.33 13.26 NA NA 
1980s Nigeria 37.67 15.39 27.51 42.32 0.33 15.87 NA NA 
1960s Norway 66.34 51.77 47.28 78.04 0.12 4.41 NA NA 
1970s Norway 74.17 54.78 48.31 74.22 0.14 7.69 NA NA 
1980s Norway 81.25 63.84 50.63 77.92 0.14 7.64 NA NA 
1960s Pakistan 44.49 21.33 40.67 47.12 0.19 3.44 1.00 0.85 
1970s Pakistan 45.14 23.47 38.08 52.14 0.19 11.41 1.00 1.00 
1980s Pakistan 51.48 25.92 38.99 50.35 0.19 6.71 0.00 0.93 
1960s Panama 26.96 28.05 19.53 105.57 0.20 1.32 NA NA 
1970s Panama 72.50 64.55 29.76 89.92 0.16 6.34 NA NA 
1980s Panama 68.08 54.50 35.85 80.09 0.16 2.90 NA NA 
1960s Peru 22.37 14.86 17.76 66.72 0.43 8.24 NA NA 
1970s Peru 32.58 15.24 18.62 47.39 0.43 22.28 NA NA 
1980s Peru 28.20 16.03 16.31 57.18 0.43 56.05 NA NA 
1960s Philippines 34.00 24.21 21.93 71.15 0.42 6.38 0.00 0.47 
1970s Philippines 42.73 34.06 20.84 80.08 0.42 11.60 0.00 0.83 
1980s Philippines 43.81 32.37 25.79 73.86 0.42 11.46 0.00 1.65 
1960s Portugal 56.61 50.29 NA 88.60 NA 4.25 NA NA 
1970s Portugal 83.43 73.10 NA 88.32 0.48 16.34 NA NA 
1980s Portugal 92.27 67.89 NA 73.32 0.41 14.75 NA NA 
1960s Qatar 12.05 14.60 24.60 122.26 NA NA NA NA 
1970s Qatar 12.14 14.13 19.43 117.76 0.18 NA NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1980s Qatar 26.90 29.88 43.67 113.41 0.18 3.70 NA NA 
1960s Samoa NA NA NA NA NA 2.55 NA NA 
1970s Samoa 19.20 9.31 10.06 48.94 NA 9.38 NA NA 
1980s Samoa 17.81 11.55 25.30 -115.62 0.28 11.41 NA NA 
1960s Singapore 18.45 42.19 57.41 251.57 NA 1.15 0.00 1.00 
1970s Singapore 33.83 66.08 56.94 198.21 0.27 6.12 0.00 0.00 
1980s Singapore 83.18 97.18 69.77 118.78 0.27 2.63 0.00 0.00 
1960s South Africa 59.76 67.28 57.94 112.60 0.30 2.93 NA NA 
1970s South Africa 59.28 63.80 56.16 107.62 0.30 9.77 NA NA 
1980s South Africa 55.37 68.84 50.18 124.22 0.30 12.71 NA NA 
1960s Spain 59.05 42.93 NA 72.20 0.10 5.94 1.00 0.24 
1970s Spain 89.67 75.60 NA 84.27 0.10 13.84 0.00 0.24 
1980s Spain 99.33 72.92 NA 73.45 0.21 9.19 1.00 0.24 
1960s Sweden 67.02 57.05 46.75 84.16 0.27 4.15 NA NA 
1970s Sweden 86.18 75.03 45.23 87.11 0.27 8.16 NA NA 
1980s Sweden 107.10 87.46 44.42 81.61 0.27 7.29 NA NA 
1960s Switzerland 112.44 97.89 94.79 87.08 0.55 3.49 1.00 2.70 
1970s Switzerland 103.22 91.66 90.44 88.80 0.55 4.62 0.00 2.70 
1980s Switzerland 146.15 134.97 110.43 92.22 0.68 3.14 0.00 2.70 
1960s Tanzania NA NA NA NA 0.48 9.22 NA NA 
1970s Tanzania NA NA NA NA 0.48 11.00 NA NA 
1980s Tanzania 25.02 7.82 15.72 30.01 0.48 23.07 NA NA 
1960s Thailand 18.34 14.38 23.91 83.00 0.26 2.03 0.00 1.00 
1970s Thailand 40.90 31.66 33.31 76.20 0.26 8.76 0.00 0.49 
1980s Thailand 64.06 54.81 48.47 85.22 0.26 5.25 0.00 0.18 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
1960s Turkey 18.78 8.92 19.01 35.06 0.33 4.72 0.00 0.49 
1970s Turkey 13.65 0.00 19.30 0.00 0.44 19.73 0.00 0.34 
1980s Turkey 24.59 7.42 15.28 24.80 0.44 32.52 0.00 0.66 
1960s Uganda 14.19 8.13 9.27 66.20 0.37 NA NA NA 
1970s Uganda 23.33 6.91 18.15 28.93 0.37 NA NA NA 
1980s Uganda 23.20 3.29 9.22 16.38 0.37 47.58 NA NA 
1960s UK 51.63 19.79 NA 38.58 0.48 4.32 1.00 0.01 
1970s UK 47.47 30.18 NA 64.41 0.31 11.95 0.00 0.01 
1980s UK 65.20 61.54 NA 91.96 0.31 6.78 1.00 0.01 
1960s US 86.76 97.50 63.00 112.25 0.51 2.79 1.00 1.48 
1970s US 96.49 109.50 61.86 113.48 0.51 7.01 0.00 1.48 
1980s US 109.86 126.38 63.10 115.11 0.51 5.16 0.00 1.48 
1960s Uruguay 28.86 23.66 22.56 80.46 0.23 27.96 NA NA 
1970s Uruguay 29.78 23.02 20.53 76.87 0.22 40.29 NA NA 
1980s Uruguay 64.08 47.46 42.22 75.66 0.22 35.58 NA NA 
1960s Venezuela 21.65 20.67 18.01 95.29 0.39 1.27 1.00 -0.24 
1970s Venezuela 37.65 38.65 26.61 102.40 0.37 6.95 1.00 -0.20 
1980s Venezuela 56.26 51.48 33.97 91.35 0.37 16.78 0.00 -0.09 
1960s Zambia 2.04 9.14 19.94 -456.23 0.36 NA NA NA 
1970s Zambia 42.73 17.76 27.56 47.18 0.36 NA NA NA 
1980s Zambia 63.20 14.76 27.79 23.27 0.31 39.21 NA NA 
1960s Zimbabwe NA NA NA NA 0.23 2.07 NA NA 
1970s Zimbabwe 21.76 16.99 14.58 87.43 0.23 7.62 NA NA 
1980s Zimbabwe 42.58 19.85 22.82 46.21 0.23 11.17 NA NA 
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Table 1: Decade-average data of 66 countries 
PERIOD COUNTRY BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS CBI D FixedX EFOI 
Note: Inflation is taken as a decimal number. For instance, if inflation is 0.1 (or 10%), the variable of D is [(0.1*100)/(0.1+1)] = 
9.09%. So, we take D= 9.09 in our estimations. Moreover, FMD measures (BSCRGDP, PRVTCRGDP, PRVTCRBS and M2GDP) 
are used in a similar way. For instance, if the ratio for any FMD is, say, 0.1 (or 10%); then we take it as “10” in our estimations. 
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Table 2: Period-average data of transition countries 
COUNTRY 
Enactment 
Year 
Year of 
Removal of 
the Ruble PERIOD CBI BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS D 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA 69.33 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Albania 1992  
3 0.51 47.08 3.73 47.29 8.06 20.82 
1 0.00 49.80 24.41 37.49 44.70 NA 
2 0.30 10.96 7.99 6.89 72.61 59.18 Armenia 1993 1996 1993 3 0.85 9.30 6.72 8.22 72.80 10.10 
1 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 14.12 92.11 
2 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.20 48.48 Azerbaijan 1992 1996 1994 3 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.35 1.39 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
2 0.43 39.81 17.62 NA 44.25 93.97 Belarus 1992 1994 
3 0.73 20.57 9.24 13.31 44.46 50.83 
1 0.00 118.53 82.80 NA 69.86 34.14 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Bulgaria 1991  
3 0.55 81.60 44.76 50.15 55.41 48.45 
1 0.15 NA NA NA NA 79.47 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Croatia 1992  
3 0.44 56.35 35.86 27.98 66.88 27.24 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Czech Republic 1991  
3 0.73 69.67 70.67 64.85 101.57 8.61 
Estonia 1993 1992 1 0.00 30.45 12.77 23.89 59.12 47.32 
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Table 2: Period-average data of transition countries 
COUNTRY 
Enactment 
Year 
Year of 
Removal of 
the Ruble PERIOD CBI BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS D 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
3 0.78 21.54 18.82 24.40 92.12 18.10 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
2 0.00 7.87 6.11 NA 77.65 61.94 Georgia 1995 1993 
3 0.73 12.35 4.69 6.69 38.13 12.77 
1 0.24 98.97 44.28 39.65 45.03 20.82 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Hungary 1991  
3 0.67 81.45 25.93 45.89 32.24 17.42 
1 0.00 49.59 49.30 NA 99.43 NA 
2 0.32 19.34 16.85 7.97 82.95 79.37 Kazakhstan 1993 1995 1993 3 0.44 7.70 5.95 9.21 77.49 16.55 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Kyrgyz Republic 1992 1993 
3 0.52 22.25 7.51 12.74 32.28 17.56 
1 0.00 18.25 17.31 NA 94.84 61.48 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Latvia 1992 1993 
3 0.49 15.71 10.70 23.56 66.45 14.72 
1 0.00 15.56 13.85 NA 88.98 80.40 
2 0.28 15.06 14.28 19.13 95.02 30.02 Lithuania 1991 1996 1993 3 0.78 13.26 10.79 16.85 81.32 6.49 
1 0.15 84.35 42.60 16.28 62.44 34.97 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Macedonia 1995  
3 0.41 25.79 23.84 12.57 92.63 1.41 
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Table 2: Period-average data of transition countries 
COUNTRY 
Enactment 
Year 
Year of 
Removal of 
the Ruble PERIOD CBI BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS D 
1 0.00 48.07 5.57 19.18 13.15 NA 
2 0.38 21.70 5.20 13.53 23.54 10.77 Moldova 1991 1995 1993 3 0.73 27.78 9.71 18.96 34.13 10.31 
1 0.00 72.36 19.00 NA 26.26 NA 
2 0.43 21.67 12.21 20.01 70.06 46.91 Mongolia 1991 1996  3 0.55 12.46 8.17 19.01 66.93 17.66 
1 0.10 20.30 15.58 29.12 67.53 66.38 
2 0.46 34.40 19.79 29.33 58.02 22.44 Poland 1991 1997  3 0.89 32.32 22.56 33.05 69.79 10.49 
1 0.23 81.14 NA 46.55 NA 69.75 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Romania 1991  
3 0.34 23.22 10.47 19.43 45.93 49.67 
1 0.00 25.92 11.79 NA 45.51 89.74 
2 0.43 28.58 10.76 14.08 37.56 70.93 Russian Federation 
1993 
1995  3 0.49 34.08 11.55 18.01 33.66 22.29 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Slovak Republic 1992  
3 0.62 59.41 48.09 58.09 80.68 7.67 
1 0.15 36.82 34.93 NA 94.85 NA 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Slovenia 1991  
3 0.63 32.19 25.31 29.82 79.64 13.00 
1 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA Tajikistan 1993 1995 
2 0.43 NA NA NA NA NA 
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Table 2: Period-average data of transition countries 
COUNTRY 
Enactment 
Year 
Year of 
Removal of 
the Ruble PERIOD CBI BSCRGDP PRVTCRGDP M2GDP PRVTCRBS D 
3 0.36 22.09 12.91 NA 58.45 NA 
1 0.00 24.91 9.01 NA 36.18 NA 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Turkmenistan 1992 1993 
3 0.26 -0.32 2.24 10.01 55.25 NA 
1 0.00 56.89 2.03 17.09 3.91 97.93 
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA Ukraine 1991 1993 
3 0.42 19.22 3.55 12.02 16.85 47.36 
Note: Inflation is taken as a decimal number. For instance, if inflation is 0.1 (or 10%), the variable of D is [(0.1*100)/(0.1+1)] = 9.09%. So, we take D= 
9.09 in our estimations. Moreover, FMD measures (BSCRGDP, PRVTCRGDP, PRVTCRBS and M2GDP) are used in a similar way. For instance, if the 
ratio for any FMD is, say, 0.1 (or 10%); then we take it as “10” in our estimations. 
CMN (2002) notes that period 1 starts in 1989. For non-former Soviet Union countries, it ends when the first central bank law is enacted. For former Soviet 
Union countries period 1 ends with “the latest of the year of enactment of the first central bank law and the year of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic 
currency”. Period 2 starts when the first central bank law is enacted and it includes the year of enactment of the second central bank law, if this law exists. 
Period 3 starts when the last central bank law is enacted and ends in 1998. 
 
 
